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MR. KEALY:

But there was general unanimity

of opinion that the red flag was used and was important.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Did the importance

run, though, Bill, to the inadequacies of the other
disclosures of contingencies?
MR. KEALY:

Yes and no. There are all kinds

of second and third derivatives here.

One of the

conversations went along these lines:
"Clearly, I've got to read the whole

report, not just the annual report, the 10-K's and 10-Q's,
and everything that's coming out and talk to everybody
under the moon, but I've got to talk to somebody someplace,
and the place I start is:

Is there a clean bill of health

here or is there something I want to delve into first?"

Secondly, there is an unstated, perhaps,
but there is an assumption that the auditor is privy to

individuals, to information which is never available to

the public observer of financial matters.

I mean, we simply don't have access to the
numbers of people within an organization, and the records

documentation of litigation, or whatever might be the
contingency.

You do.
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And when it's known by the preparer of
that information that the auditor may exercise his right

to indicate some qualifier, there is a presumption, again
maybe wrong, but there is a presumption that there will
be more disclosure or that the disclosure will be more

specific or that the disclosure will be more prominently

placed in the financials and not weaved somewhere into
the background.
If you eliminate that implied or express
threat or option — let's deescalate, let's call it the

option of the auditor, to put a subjective opinion in

a report, if that's removed in some subtle way, the
power shift between the auditor, as the representative
of the rightness and the correctness of the accounting,
and so on, and the users shifts in favor of the preparer,
but maybe there will be less disclosure, maybe the

disclosure will be more obtuse, obscure, and that may
be the wrong presumption to reach, but it clearly is

the presumption that exists, at least in the universe
that I'm interactive with.

I have one question I should have asked
before I went off on this tirade:

It's not clear to me -
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and I did read all the materials -- because of my
personal background, it's not clear to me whether we're

talking of the elimination of the "Subject To" and not
"Except For" and disclaimers and other methods of

qualifying statements.
Are we talking about no qualifiers or
are we talking about one particular type of qualifier

being changed?

MR. MULLARKEY:

question, yes.

That's an excellent

The proposal is to eliminate the "Subject

To" qualification and any other way or expressing the

same item.

In other words, we are not touching any

other of our reporting options except for what would be

used if the disclosure was inadequate in a particular case,
but it is the elimination of the "Subject To" as it
relates to the redundancy of the expression.

Now, the one part that may be confusing

in the proposal is the fact that there are two other

ways that an auditor can deal with an uncertainty under

our current reporting standards.
One is to disclaim for an uncertainty, and
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the other is to emphasize an uncertainty, but not affect
the opinion.

And the proposal we have would eliminate

those two options as it relates to an uncertainty, and

all the rest of our reporting literature remains as it is.

Is that responsive?
MR. KEALY:

That's responsive.

Perhaps you have this kind of information
as to how many "Subject To" qualifications there are?

Is it quite a few, or fewer than "Except For's" or other

types of disclaimers?
Is it the predominant form

auditor

qualification statement?

MR. MULLARKEY:

We would expect it’s the

predominant "Except For" uncertainty, but "Except For"
opinions are not for the public market, because there is

a group which looks upon those with a bit of disdain.
And neither are disclaimers very often

seen in the public markets, but in the private markets
I don't think we have statistics, but if you get out of

the area of uncertainties, Bill, then there are a

significant number of adverse opinions, "Except For"
opinions, and perhaps disclaimers, although I'm not so
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sure of that, except that that's something that deals
with items other than uncertainties.

Uncertainty, I think, is by far the prior
form of modification of the report.
MR. HUFF:

The auditor's standards that

run to his representation that the audit has been
performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing

standards are retained, so if there is an elimination of
the auditor's scope, that type of a qualification
certainly is retained.

And in addition, the auditor has an

opinion with respect to conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles of the financial statement,
and if there is an exception to that opinion, either
because of disclosures or because of wrong accounting

in terms of measurement standards, that is obviously
retained as well.
In addition, we haven't mentioned there

are other types of auditor references that would be
retained and aren't affected by this proposal.

For example, a consistency reference

where there is a change in accounting standards.
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The auditor’s reference as a consistent application
of accounting standards would be retained as it is,

so there would be an obligation to retain the accounting

principles and for the auditor, in his report, to make
reference to that change.

So it just deals with the area of

uncertainty, where the financial statements aren't wrong
in terms of adequate disclosure, in terms of adequate

measurement standards, but there is the uncertainty with
respect to a contingency of one concern —

MR. KEALY:

Well, I am sure unac I would

stay with the statement, hearing all the explanation,

that I made initially that there would be in the opinion
of the individual analysts and the representatives of

the corporate finance activities that I spoke with, that

say an uncertainty like litigation or an uncertainy like

some — well, stay with that, litigation, for the moment;
were there to be no "Subject To" opinion potentially
usable by the auditor, even though I understand why the
auditors — you know, we aren't reporters, we aren't

evaulators of these facts, et cetera, et cetera.
But there is a belief that that potential
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language in the auditor’s statement does encourage fuller

disclosure of those items or gives prominence to those

items, and that you have access to the counsel of the
company that’s actually litigating the matter, and so

forth.

And often we don’t, and there is a barrier thrown

up, "This matter is in litigation, we can't disclose it,
period, go away."

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

The fact that you

brought this up, it's very good because it’s why we need
to have this meeting more than anything else, because

Bill's point is their perception, and we understand that.
Our goals are exactly the same.

And your

perception is elimination of the "Subject To" will weaken
our ability to insist on good disclosure.

That's precisely the argument of the
majority that want to eliminate, because they believe
elimination of the "Subject To" takes away some of the
clout the auditor has, because if he's forced to go to

an "Except For" opinion, which is "Except For the failure

to adequately disclose," that's a much stronger insistence
on adequacy of disclosure, so that doesn't mean — I'm not

arguing who is right, I am only pointing out to the group
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that we come with the very same objective and the very

same concern, and reach precisely opposite conclusions
as to what best accomplishes that.
Paul?

MR. WYCISKALA:

Speaking to Bill’s point

of the perception of the users of statements that denying

the use of "Subject To" would make the. preparers feel

comfortable with less disclosure, those preparers that
I've talked to speculate just the opposite, that if the

auditor feels as if he's losing some protection, which

is perhaps put in more jeopardy by being denied the use
of the red flag, that the auditor is likely to be more —

to use more concern about contingencies and their

adequate disclosure in the statements.
Indeed, we expressed the opinion that the

audit fees might even go up.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

That's an advantage

we hadn't noticed for the last —
MR. WYCISKALA:

But at least the speculation

of those users I talked to is just the opposite.

MR. GREENE:
with Bill.

I'd like to spend some time

I notice most of the subjects just tend to be
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litigation, that’s by far the largest category, and that’s

not just preparing an audit, that is also with the law
firm.

And I think that’s why it’s a much more complicated

issue with respect to litigation, because it's not simply

the preparer, but rather the judgment of the law firm as
to what can be said about a particular case.

How do you view the subject with respect

to litigation?

You want a red flag to point out that

there is some really serious litigation here that might
not otherwise be spotted,

because all companies have

litigation, and some can be significant and some not.
How do you use it in terms of litigation,

because that's the area I think of most interest to me.
MR. KEALY:

on a case-by-case basis.

Well, you'd have to respond

I mean, obviously the asbestos

suits that affect Johns Manville and Eagle-Picher

or

others that have qualifications because of that, or also
other companies, those problems were well known before.

As the evidence of the stock price shows,
those problems were well known before the ’’Subject To"

opinion surfaced, but there are probably many, many other
newer companies, smaller companies, companies that we
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don't know as well, and which have not been as prominent -

the litigation has not been so prominently displayed in

the papers, and so forth.

So you know, it just short-cuts and directs
you to an area of investigation that you would
were doing a job eventually get to.

if you

You get there a

little faster, you get there a little sooner.

I don't know how really to respond in the

abstract, we have to talk about specific instances.

I

just know that procedurally we have to start someplace,

and one place we might start is —

MR. GREENE:

Are you satisfied that

litigation disclosure is adequate, and this is just a

way for you to save time, or do you view the "Subject To"

as —
MR. KEALY:

I think there have been many

instances, individual instances, where the feeling was
no, there wasn't enough disclosure in litigation, but
you know, it's — I realize the problems.

I mean, I can empathize with both sides,
but I think clearly no, the "Subject To" plus what's

disclosed, often isn't adequate.

You hit these barriers.
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And there is a feeling, maybe wrongly,
that the auditor has a little bit more clout and can
push, you know, for more information.
Now, I don’t know how the auditors would

know that we feel that the disclosure is inadequate,
because there is no dialogue there.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
perception

I think we have a

you have better access to information some

times than we do.
MR. MEBUS:

Getting to that same point,

we have also seen where companies would try to resolve

litigation quicker so they can receive both benefits.
Getting back to the point that you made
earlier, Jim, that of not having or having, I think we have

seen companies — companies don’t like big negative
opinions, they like to keep as much information of that

as possible.
But even more so, we have found they

dislike having a negative opinion, and they'll do anything
to keep a "Subject To" off.

And we’ve seen them try to resolve it
faster.

They're trying to do as many things as possible,
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so they reduce the side benefits in certain actions
quicker.
And from our point of view, we see having

that as a tool for the auditor is a benefit.
MR. MULLARKEY:

One comment that you made

about its causing the company to resolve this faster —

MR. MEBUS:

They try to.

MR. MULLARKEY:

You mean that to the extent

they might do something they wouldn't ordinarily do?

MR. MEBUS:

I would hope not, but I think

they — knowing the pressures they come down to from

their shareholders, when they see that, they say, you

know — if they can accelerate a legal reaction, they
try to do that and try and promote certain accommodations,

rather than drag it out, resolve it quicker.
Whether or not they would do that if that
wasn't there — I just think the incentive, there is a

little more incentive pattern there.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Jim, did you have

something?
MR. WATTERSTON:

Well, I would start to

say you have this "Subject To" opinion that's directed
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to a footnote,you’re talking about a material potential

adjustment to the financial statement, and I don't see

how the auditor on the one hand can say it presents —

on the one hand can say it presents fairly, and in the
note somewhere say that there is a potential adjustment
that's going to change, or would have if we knew the

results, change the income statement.

So I mean it seems to be entirely con
sistent .
MR. MULLARKEY:

Not really, since the

footnote represents management's disclosure, ana the
auditor's opinion is really merely opining on the

financial statement in total, including the footnote.
So the footnote is not the auditor's.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

Well, I would say maybe

the footnote is fully adequate disclosure, but it may

contain in it the potential for a material adjustment to
the financial statement, which it would seem to me is
quite different from whether or not there is full

disclosure.
And to the extent that the auditor draws
our attention as users to a potential adjusting entry
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that's somewhere buried in the fine print, I think it's

very worthwhile.

MR. WATTERSTON:

I don't disagree with

that, I agree with it.
MR. GRIMMIG:

much what Jim just said.

I'd like to support very

It seems to me the whole

argument is just that, that what it's saying in the
footnote, the auditor is saying that's management's

opinion, but that is subject to, in the lawyer's letter,
the auditor, not management, and by golly, as a financial

institution for 14,000 banks in the United States. I'd
like that ''Subject To” in the auditor's letter so we
don't get this kind of handwashing that's not the
footnote’s, not the auditor's.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
that last comment.

I don't understand

What is the handwashing?

I don't

know what that means.

MR. GRIMMIG:

A denial of responsibility

for the footnotes.
MR. MULLARKEY:

But I guess the auditor

doesn't deny the responsibility for the adequacy of the

disclosure of the footnotes even though they are
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management's because of' the "Except For" option.

Was

that the point?
MR. WATTERSTON:

Well, I think the point

is if there is a potential material adjustment to these
statements that's buried in the footnote, your proposal

would allow the auditor to give a clean opinion even

though had this uncertainty been resolved by the time
the auditor's report was issued, the statements might
look quite different, and it seems to me that's saying

we want the auditor to have some say about it.

Not whether management disclosed it
somewhere, but whether or not, you know, if the
uncertainty is resolved, it could happen —

MR. MULLARKEY:

Well, the uncertainty

will not change what the auditor is reporting on, that
material can't be revised.
MR. WATTERSTON:
because of the rules.

No, we understand that

But if that uncertainty was

resolved by the time the auditor issued his statement,
the statement that we're looking at, analyzing it might
be completely different.

MR. MULLARKEY:

That would also be noted.

17

Be noted?

MR. WATTERSTON:

Not by the

auditor, though.

MR. JONES:

Yes, if anything happens

after the date of the financial statement but prior
to the issuance of the opinion that would be material

to those financial statements for the prior period,

then the auditor would be required to disclose that.
MR. WATTERSTON:

I understand that, but

if it is unresolved, if you have an unresolved uncertainty,

which we all see every day, that's normal, and you would
give a clean opinion on that with the prior disclosure

in the footnote, but what I am saying is this:

Doesn't

a user have the right to know that the statements he's
looking at would be quite different if that uncertainty
was resolved in an adverse way?
MR. MULLARKEY:

Separate and apart from

the fact that the footnotes will indicate that?
MR. WATTERSTON:

MR. JONES:

That's right.

I think we have to make the

assumption, one, that the users of the financial
statements are reasonably versed in generally accepted

accounting principles, and that they're familiar with
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the requirements of Statement No. 5, which requires
certain disclosures or the booking of certain liabilities

or whatever, for uncertainties.
We also have to make the assumption as
auditors that those people that are reading the financial
statements have a reasonable understanding of the

reporting standards that are required of auditors.
So I think if we make those assumptions

and the people are reasonably versed in that, then I

see that there is really no problem.

I do have a problem though with doing
away with the paragraph that allows the auditor to give

additional emphasis to certain matters.

I don’t think

we’re talking about that yet.
MR. MULLARKEY:

MR. JONES:

Right.

I’ll talk about that a little

later.
MR. MULLARKEY:

MR. BROADUS:

Yes?

Isn't one of the reasons

for doing away with it that people aren't familiar with

what it means?

MR. JONES:

I am saying as auditors we
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have to make an assumption. You know, as auditors or

accounting standards bodies, you cannot promulgate
principles or auditing standards for the general public

as a whole, you have to put certain limits on that, and
I think the limits that you have to place are that those
people that are using financial statements are

sophisticated enough to have a reasonable understanding
of both reporting standards and accounting principles.
You know, to allow Joe Blow, public —
and I am not saying anything bad, but I am saying there
are a lot of people out there that are unknowledgeable,

completely unknowledgeable of both accounting principles
and reporting practices.

And if they are, you know, I guess that's
their tough luck.

MR. MULLARKEY:

Let me ask Bill Kinney a

question about research.
In looking at the "Subject To" opinions,

was there any agreement as to the amount of disclosure?

In other words, did the study show that the disclosure
was not really adequate on the statements, thus "Subject

To" statements were made without a proper foundation?
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I am sure there must have been a lot of

uncertainties on financial statements where there were

no "Subject To” opinions.
There's got to be thousands of them.

Now, what really caused that, that there was not enough
disclosure on the financial statements?

Was it just

something the auditor said "I'll make it 'Subject To'"?
MR. KINNEY:

On these stock price studies,

it's difficult to tell in reading the footnotes.

Some

times you think this is really a terrible thing, and it

must be going to get a "Subject To" opinion, and quite
often those would not be subject to a "Subject To"
opinion because the auditor decided in those cases not

to qualify, for whatever reason, and it's not entirely
clear why you would or wouldn't qualify.
But auditing standards and the interpretation

of auditing standards say the auditor should qualify
the opinion if the lawsuit will probably be lost in

litigation, if the probability of resolution is adverse.
When the outcome of the event is probably

adverse, it probably will lose the case, then should you

have a "Subject To" opinion?

That's what an interpretation
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of FAS2 says the auditor should do.
Now, in at least one of the stock price

studies it is consistent with that view, that auditors
are qualifying on these more serious — not serious in

amount, but damages, because the amounts are indeterminate

as of the reporting date, but the probable assessment,
and so the auditor in effect is required to predict the

outcome of the lawsuit, the probability of losing the case.
And management is not required to be

that definitive.

You’re talking about public interest in
this area.

Someone argued that the management and

their legal counsel ought to be required to give the

disclosure of the probability of lawsuits.
MR. MULLARKEY:

That’s the point I was

trying to get. Is the management then going farther than
legal counsel in saying this is the likelihood of its

happening, in saying management is giving more than the
auditor and their own general counsel is giving, is that
the role of the auditor?
MR. GREENE:

footnote.

The idea is to drive to the

Assume that the footnote disclosure is adequate,
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especially with respect to litigation, and the club is
not going to be subject to disclaimer.

I find that very difficult, and it's

really the relationship between management,counsel and

the outside auditor, and I think the case has not been made
that we ought to abandon entirely the idea.

What you're saying is that we ought to
have a picture-box opinion, we can't emphasize it, we
can't point it out, we just say — one paragraph —

"Go to the footnote."

And what does the opinion or counsel mean?
What does management's judgment mean?

And the "Subject

To" may be something that helps the world sort out how

companies really are in perspective.
But you're putting an awful lot on 5

to help out the subjects, but I'm really not certain

how much it can carry, even though it's working with
uncertainty, but to me that's a critical area.

MR. MULLARKEY:

Does that mean that the

disclosure is inadequate?
MR. GREENE:
disclosure.

I think it's a spectrum
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

You're in effect

saying that you believe that the auditor's report

irrespective of whether that is an appropriate role or

not, the auditor's report is an enhancement of the

overall disclosure?
MR. GREENE:

Well, if you make me

characterize it that way, then you can point out that's

not an auditor's role.
I think there is accessed

to management and so forth.

information

I think they are signals

with respect to financial statements.

MR. PREWOZNIK:
to put it, Jim.

That's an interesting way

Certainly the average reader of a

financial statement, somebody who is not deeply involved

with financial statements as the auditor must be,
certainly is not in the same position to assess the
materiality of a particular contingency or a company

at a particular point in time.
Now, I can't sit there and look at these

statements for another corporation and arrive at the

same conclusion that the auditor of that company can.
For that reason, many of us do think that this "Subject To"
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in the auditor’s opinion, this so-called red flag,
as everybody keeps referring to it, does have a very

useful purpose.
One point that Bill made, and I guess
Bob Mebus agreed with, is that the power shift from

the auditor to the client as a result of eliminating

a "Subject To" opinion is real.

Another view of that

is the one that Tom expressed, and I'd like to just
emphasize that.
Many of us feel the power has shifted

in the opposite direction.

Right now, the auditor

has a middle ground he can use.

"Subject To" opinions.

He can use these

Without the opportunity to

use a "Subject To" opinion, one can say that his power

is increased, either that he'll take a stronger stance
with the client, and that the client has to do some

accounting, and if the client does not feel that's

appropriate or the client has to put a definite
disclosure into his footnote, so it's not clear that
there is a power shift from the auditor to the client.

It could well be just the opposite.
MR. KEALY:

Well, if there was evidence
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that the auditor would use the "Except For" — I mean,
the disclaimer more aggressively than has been the

case, then maybe you can argue that the power shift

has been in the direction of the auditor.
MR. WATTERSTON:

He doesn’t have the

same options.
We would not start with the presumption
that that would happen.

We would start with the

presumption that without the "Subject To" the power

shift goes to the preparer.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

I’m saying there might

be another presumption that might issue now.

MR. KEALY:

I underscored the point

about the interpretative aspect with respect to litigation.

I can tell you from personal experience and from the

experience of others who are in the position of being

security analysts approaching companies, you know, you
really do run into a wall with respect to something
like litigation.

You're not given, normally, you're not

given access to trial counsel, to the individuals
involved in particular transactions, and the management

26

will, I don't want to use the word hide behind, but the
management will suggest that, you know, "We've said

everything we can say, this is a delicate matter,
we can't say more than we have said in the public

disclosure," and the management as the plaintiff is

never going to say, "We think we're going to lose this

suit."
You know, I think that's a reduction
ad absurdum that the plaintiff is going to say publicly

in a written document, "We're going to lose."
You know it ain't going to happen.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Bill, do you think

that given a plaintiff saying "I'm not going to lose,"
and a plaintiff's counsel saying "They aren't going to

lose," do you believe that the auditors are saying they

might when they give a "Subject To" opinion, and that
the auditor is entitled to that opinion?

There are two questions, I'll admit.
MR. KEALY:

Let me state it differently.

There is no doubt in my mind that the plaintiff is not

going to say it.

There is also no doubt in my mind

that because the plaintiff asserts they're going to win
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that they are going to win.
I mean, I think it's up to the plaintiff

to assert that they are innocent.

I think the auditor

would, the auditor could.

Whether the auditor has the obligation
to do that or the right to do it, I don't know.

It

gets fuzzy.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

No.

Do you believe

that when there is a "Subject To" that given a management

saying "I am going to win," and the management's counsel
saying "I am going to win," that when an auditor gives
the "Subject To" that's saying we don't agree with you,

we think you're going to lose?
MR. KEALY:
I believe that.

The simple answer is yes.

It sure as hell makes for an interesting

dialogue.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Would it bother

you if I asserted that that's absolutely wrong?
MR. KEALY:

Well, I don't ever like to

be wrong, but that doesn't change my presumption.

MR. WATTERSTON:

I think probably the

auditor is saying there is a potential there and you
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yourself better be aware of that potential when you
look at these financial statements.
It's as simple as that.
MR. MULLARKEY:

Mr. Prewoznik.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

I'm kind of searching

for a focus of this discussion.

Let me take a whack

at it, particularly on the contingencies on litigation.

As I understand the present rules of
the game, the focus is about the definition of

uncertainty in FAS2.

And as I understand — I hope

you can all help me if I'm wrong — the uncertainties

that bring into play the prospect for "Subject To"
are the disclosure required when the matter is not

susceptible of reasonable estimation.

Let's put that in the context of
litigation contingency.

We're dealing with something

that is a known litigation.

The present rules would

indicate that if under FAS5, which came into focus
after FAS2, and probably these words appear in FAS2,
if under FAS5 you have a situation where you had a
litigation that needed to be handled in the financial

statements, but it couldn't meet the reasonably estimated
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test of paragraph 8 of FAS5, then your only choice is

to state, if that outcome is at least reasonably
possible to be in the negative, or rather to estimate
the possible loss, or, as it says, "A range of loss,

or state that such an estimate cannot be made.”
So if you take the present format with

FAS2 and FAS5, if you have a disclosure under FAS5, the
only way FAS2 comes into play is when the disclosed

litigation hinges on the fact that you can’t estimate
the outcome.

And then FAS2 says "Well, footnote, we're
dealing in FAS5 with things that are material, we
aren't dealing with immaterial things."

1

I’m troubled by the fact personally —

and that’s why I’m not speaking for my committee, or
the auditing standards — my trouble is when you

finally get to paragraph 29 the ball game is whether
the auditor’s judgment in respect of one of these

matters that can’t be estimated is significant.

My problem is how do you sort out the
wheat from the chaff?
If all the FAS disclosures in the financial
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statement are by definition material?

I don't see any criteria anywhere,

unless maybe in some of these releases and interpretations,
and so forth.

I'm concerned that there are no rules for

the auditor to determine what's significant and what's
not significant.

And I would feel it's better to encourage
diligence and completeness of disclosure under FAS5 to

get it all out, rather than to have, in my feeling, some

kind of a crapshoot in the judgment of the auditor as

to what's significant and what's not significant,
because I'm concerned there is a great risk there of
imperfection.
I don't think that's in the public
interest.

But I make these observations mainly to

focus, I think, that what we're talking about here is
the loss contingency with respect to which you can't
make a reasonable estimate.

That's the focus.

Then the question really up for grabs
here is: is it a significant matter?

And the present

literature, FAS2, seems to say that if it's a significant
matter in the judgment of the auditor, he's got to go
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"Subject To".
So I think that the issue here is how

can we expect these auditors to come to grips with
these questions of significance?
I think it's difficult. I've always

felt like that.

Quite frankly, I've been in situations

where I've been intrigued by the sorts of head games
that go on in this area.

I've always been troubled by it.

MR. KEALY:

Can I ask a question.

If you particularize that, since it's

dangerous, but the way I can relate to that situation,

suppose you had a situation, a Johns Manville with

open-ended lawsuits and damages -- and today, as every
week goes by more people seem to be affected by them —

Can't be reasonably estimated.

MR. BROADUS:

MR. KEALY:

I mean it cannot be estimable,

and that appears in the footnotes and there is no
"Subject To” opinion, which there is now.

We eliminate

the "Subject To” opinion, we say we eliminate six million

Americans, or whatever it has been, who have been exposed
to this, and it's totally unestimable.
End of story?

That's adequate?

To me,
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that is not adequate.
MR. BROADUS:

But is that a significant

uncertainty or an insignificant uncertainty?

MR. KEALY:
MR. BROADUS:
MR. KEALY:

It's very significant.

What is not significant?
That's life-threatening,

as significant as anything can be.

MR. HODGES:

I am going to ask whether

or not the present draft is really going to solve the
problems that you raised, because I think the auditors
are telling us that if you don’t give all the disclosures
you deem material, and they think something is significant

enough, they'll take an "Except For” opinion.
MR. BROADUS:

"Subject To" goes to that.

I don't think that the

I think that the "Subject To"

is based on the assumption that FAS5 has brought forth

everything required under GAAP.

It says that "Subject

To" should really only be driving you to read a
particular or several contingency footnotes that are
already adequate in describing the situation.

Presumably, if they are inadequate, for
example if it's almost certain there is a loss but the
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company will not admit it in the footnote, then it's

not GAAP.

It's not "Subject To."

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

by 5.

Yes, it's covered

I personally don't have any — I mean, you said

"correct me if my analysis of the literature is wrong.”
I don't think any board members want to

correct your analysis of where we are.

MR. GREENE:

So you'd say that eliminate
»

the "Subject To” and rely upon 5 with respect to
disclosure?

In litigation, you're satisfied that 5 is

adequate today in terms of assessing the impact, or

litigation on a company, where it's almost impossible
to get — you rarely see any estimates of range of loss;
what you basically usually see is "It's a lawsuit, we

cannot estimate the possible likelihood of damages if we
lose."
They might tell you how many claims and

what's happened before, and settlement policies, and
so on and so forth, but is 5 adequate then with respect
to the disclosure of the impact of litigation on companies
today?

MR. BROADUS:

If it's not, who should take
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the responsibility for the disclosure of this impact?

I mean, Ed, it either has to be there

or we've got a big problem with FAS5.
I don't have any experience, do you, where

you've been concerned where there is a disclosure in a

note in accordance with FAS5, where they come to a case
where they say— they give the various factors to the

extent that they can in keeping with FAS5, that "We can't

reasonably estimate the outcome, we can't do it."
Now, I think there are cases where the
auditors, if they feel that there is some shortcoming

on the part of management, that in reaching that
conclusion, you have ways of qualifying the opinion in

other ways, but if management does reach the conclusion
with its lawyers that they can't reasonably estimate
the outcome, but it's clearly painted, you've got a
Johns Manville, a big case, a big problem, what else do

you want the auditor to do?

I guess what I'm saying is it seems to

me that some of the words you use are seeking from
somebody else outside the company to

tell you over and

above that what is the expected impact.
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MR. GREEN:

I think there is a -- I think

the notion of a red flag is helpful, because I think

there is a tension between 5 and the auditor, and I

think, secondly, if you take out the "Subject To" and
assume that the disclaimer will result, that’s not likely
to happen.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

"Except For,” not

the disclaimer.
MR. GREEN:

"Except For."

What the

assumption is, is that the club of the "Except For" is

so strong that you will say much, much more with respect
to litigation to avoid that, and I think that raises all
kinds of questions as to how you can adequately disclose

litigation, and the "Subject To" probably does give

a pretty rough red flag to people who don't understand

sometimes how you —

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
value does it have beyond 5, though?

Well, what information

I mean, yes, we’ve

pointed out and said, "Be sure and read this footnote."
The footnote says precisely what it would

say without that, so are you believing or is anyone
believing there is then an information value added by the
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auditor's report, be it that yes, he's probably made a

different probability assessment?

MR. BROADUS:

I ’don't see that.

MR. LANDSITTEL:

Well, let's assume

a situation where there are X number of people that
might or might not be affected, and it's pretty clear

that you cannot determine what the effect might be, and
that is clearly disclosed in the financial statements;
how do you interpret the "Subject To" beyond that?

What do you read into the "Subject To"?
MR. KEALY:

I just said that that

asbestos example is a tough one, because it's so widely

known, but there might be some other instance where the
adequacy of the disclosure is unquestionable, we can't

determine the impact, but if that was one of seven or

23 footnotes, you know, "There is a contingent liability,
and we can't adequately determine the impact," and it's
right in there, number 11, and there is no "Subject To"

that pushes you to probe a little further.

You may get

no more information disclosed.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

But Bill, your

point, you're I think saying that given — we're
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obviously talking about material items, or else it
wouldn’t trigger any of this to start with — a given

piece of litigation, you’re saying that even though

management and the attorneys are saying that the amount
is not determinable and the outcome as to success and

failure is not, you’re believing that when there is a
"Subject To," the

auditor has evaluated those pieces

of litigation as being more probable of adverse settlement
'

MR. KEALY:

Or more probable of having

a material effect on this undisclosed —
MR. MEBUS:

More material.

MR. KEALY:

The answer is yes. Yes, more

material.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Both figure numbers,

super material as opposed to material?

MR. KEALY:

into semantics.

Well, now we’re getting

More material.
MR. MULLARKEY:

Let me address Mr. Baker,

because Bill has elegantly described his approach, how
he would view the auditor’s report there, and when you
started out, I had an impression — I thought you were

saying when you saw the "Subject To," that led you to
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conclude that there was going to be more disclosure,
but I think what I hear you saying now is the "Subject

To" presents in your mind a disclosure which is not
otherwise presented in the financial statements in any
case.

If that’s a correct interpretation, I
would like to get Mr. Baker and Mr. Korn to see where
you are coming from and how —

MR. KORN:

Well, it's a disclosure in

the non-technical sense of the word, a

sense.

non-accounting

It's more information, and I think we appreciate

the judgment and the independence of the argument, and
I think the argument for retention was well presented

in the issue paper, as well as the argument for elimination.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Well, you worried

us there for a minute.

MR. KORN:

It's a very difficult resolution

problem, and obviously that's why we're here, and we are
interested in discussing it.

I just might add that speaking for myself

as a chartered financial analyst, as a member of the
Boston Security Analysts Accounting Committee, we favor
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retention.

That’s where we come out on it.
But it's because the arguments in favor

weigh so strongly for elimination that I think it's a

very close call.
And Bill I think positioned it very, very
nicely.
MR. BAKER:

Since the three of us

represent the same constituency, it won't surprise you
our views are parallel.

There are nuances of interpre

tation, but it won't surprise you that we come down
to the same conclusion, and I think it's helpful in a

discussion like this to remember the conclusion

you're

trying to get to anyway.

When Jim set the stage for the discussion

to open the meeting, there was a desire to look at
every conceivable point of view from every conceivable

perspective, so that you made sure you touched on all

conceivable influences on a final conclusion.
But what we're really trying to get to

is should you eliminate "Subject To" or not eliminate it,

and what would be the prime criteria on that, that you
would use to reach that decision.
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I think with us it's a question of

whether it's an accounting policy which is useful to
users of financial statements or not, because we

represent a user’s group here, and there is a conclusion

that's almost inescapable from everything that has come
up here so far, and that is that some people find it
useful for some purposes.
We could take Bill Kinney's synopsis

of the research.

He used a word like ambiguous.

I think

that’s a common thread that's gone through many of these
comments, and it's well to keep in mind what is really

meant by that phrase.
He used ambiguous to describe a study

that said some people used it and some people didn't use
it.

I don't find that very ambiguous, it's useful to

some; therefore, it meets the test of being an accounting
standard, where I think the burden of proof in its
elimination should go to the other side.

In John Mullarkey's comments, he said
"This is a redundant concept, we now have reporting so

effective in other parts of the financial state
ment that
we no longer need it."
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Well, heck, the earning line of the

financial statement is redundant; you've got all the
income and all the outgo.

It’s redundant.

No one needs to figure that out.

This is

like that, it's a summary thing, it brings your attention
to an element that some investors wouldn’t notice other

wise.

Everybody doesn't have the time, but Goldman Sachs

institutional analysts do to pore through every financial
statement.

Many investors just grab that and look to

the "Subject To" as an important element.

MR. MULLARKEY;

Let me take that just a

little further for a moment.
In two cases, where you have a litigation ■

let's take an absurd situation where you had an identical
disclosure of a similar event in the footnotes. In one

case the auditors concluded they could issue a clean
opinion, in the other case the auditors concluded they
could issue a "Subject To" opinion.
In both companies, how would you make an
investment decision, would that taint your decision in

any way?
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MR. BAKER:

I believe where the "Subject

To" opinion came, the investors would be more aware than
otherwise in the case.

MR. MULLARKEY:

But would it affect your

analysis of whether it is warranted or not?

MR. BAKER:

In our case, I don't think

it would make a big difference, but I don't think it's
fair to imply from the way we invest that other investors —-

MR. MULLARKEY:

So from your standpoint not,

but you think from the standpoint of other investors?
MR. BAKER:

Yes.

MR. KEALY:

I would say definitely it would

make a difference.

Again, whether that's correct or incorrect,

I know your research says both of those stocks would have
adjusted in some way prior to the disclosure of the
opinion if the information was valuable and both stocks

would have adjusted previous to the "Subject To," and
there is no informational content that suggests that

they would adjust further after it,

notwithstanding, I

think, there is some — to me, it's unique enough, you
know, the 37 cases or whatever the heck the numbers show,
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it would have to have some sufficient unqualifiable but

negative impact on the investor.
MR. GRIMMIG:

I’d like to support what I’ve

just heard from this side of the table from a banker’s

viewpoint, and let me go back and give you a little
practical banking experience that I’ve had over 20 years.

We’re talking of public companies with

financial statements prepared by independent CPA's, and
the loan request that in general is going to be a million

dollars or higher,in general. The junior analyst who first
gets the three or five years of financial statements to

analyze is, frankly, a college graduate, maybe in a limited
number of cases in the money center banks an MBA, and

probably has had a 26-week training course, of which ten
in credits is the most you can expect from him.
He is probably using a computer now to do

some of the spread analysis, and unfortunately the
computer does not pick up footnotes and it cannot weigh

footnotes.
It does its analysis on numbers.

The junior

who has to then put his work product to the sponsoring
line or lending officer, who would probably have to get
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his senior on it, so there will be at least loan officers

signing off.

Those signing-off loan officers are relying

to a great extent on the work product of a junior, as
practical banking experience.

That junior's work product can be secondguessed only by myself or a senior officer pretty much
doing this through a credit file, or doing this through

an auditor's statement.
I do have the time and I do take the time

to look at that auditor's letter.

I don't have the time

to dive into four pages or two pages of footnotes on
every item to make sure that the junior hasn't missed

a point.
I find it extremely helpful to have that

red flag in a one-sheet piece of paper that has a
prominent auditor's headnote, an address and a signature
at the bottom, rather than have the information perhaps

elaborated on in two or three-page footnotes on page 45.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Maybe one of our

problems here is not — at times when we do this, I know

it's going to sound as though we're eventually going to

argue with the user groups, but to get to the concept of
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usefulness which Dave brought up, and which we’re
obviously after, the flag itself, which you assert is

useful, is probably only useful if in fact our two
perceptions as to what it means are the same.

I’m concerned when I hear things like
’’I appreciate that auditor’s judgment.”
Now, what judgment is it that you

appreciate, that you think went into that "Subject To"
opinion?

It is really rather critical to us, because we

acknowledge the usefulness argument.

It's tough to say

that this third paragraph isn’t, you know, potentially

useful, but from our standpoint if we believe in fact
it's not useful in that it's being misused, and you

believe it's something that in fact it isn't, which is
really a very strong contention we have, if you believe

it's something we don't think it is, then it isn't useful
any longer, it's in fact disuseful.

In fact, it's mis

leading.
So when we say things like what is the

confidence, "I appreciate this and I appreciate this

judgment," what is it exactly that you think the
auditors have done, because I think that the analysis
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of 5 and 2 was essentially correct.
MR. BAKER:
double-think.

Jim, that sounds to me like

Could you explain to me the logic behind

that argument?

You say if it’s being misinterpreted by
people, you’re going to take it away so they won’t think

there is more there than there is; how does the absence
of it create more understanding?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Let me ask you —

I can't answer that unless I know whether I need to take
it away.

I don’t think, because I don’t know whether it is

being misused, but I believe that if people think that

the auditor’s modifying an opinion to a "Subject To"

is necessarily a different concept of materiality beyond
what we already appreciate is material, whatever that

number is, whether it is an assessment of probability,

then those users are wrong, for that is not what is

intended.
MR. BAKER:

If it’s neither an assessment

of probability, nor the special materiality, why does it
exist?

MR. MULLARKEY:

That's why we're here.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
here.

That's why we're

I'm not sure it should.
MR. BAKER:

Why does it exist in the 38

cases we are interested in, because somebody —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Because the literature

discusses it, and once the literature has it in it,some

auditor is going to find uncertainty in the situation and

say, "Gee, I'd better say this."
That doesn't go back to what the user
group believes —

MR. KEALY:

One auditor for the

on

one company reading these standards that have been
established for him or for her reaches the conclusion

that this is, either because of probabilities or because
of the special materiality — you know, isn't that very

useful to the user to know that that auditor with those

standards reached that conclusion, and it has to be
reached either because of probably uncertainty or materiality

Somebody operating under a standard set

by this body says, "I need to put an extra little twist on
that, Paul."

MR. MULLARKEY:

I think the issue to

remember — part of the issue to remember we are struggling
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with is that when the contingency and uncertainty issue
came forward, which discussed uncertainty, it was the

feeling of the auditing group at that time that that was

sufficient.

There are always disagreements, we never

agree on anything totally.
There were disagreements, but that that

provided the adequate basis on which to discuss these
and that therefore we moved to eliminate it is as being

redundant. That was a redundant comment in that it was

redundant with what was required.

When we make the assessment we make the
assessment in relation to what is now required, but our

literature has been held to a position of being prior
to what was required that we now think is adequate.

So the decision is made in relation to
the same accounting standards as management would use
in coming up with their own view, but we have this

prior requirement which we feel, many of us who want to

eliminate it feel is inadequately articulated because
the current requirement is adequate for disclosure, but
the issue that we've been wrestling with is how can we

eliminate what we think is not useful.
MR. KEALY:

Let me make one statement,
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with all due respect to the body assembled.

Mr. Bailey

was asking the question, you know, you have to make

assumptions about the knowledge of users, do they have
adequate knowledge of the accounting standards and
the auditing standards.

If you the user of financial

statements understand the subtleties just disclosed

or discussed, which is that the "Subject To" opinion

might be put forth by auditors who are operating
under standards which predated the issuance of the
FAS 5, I think I can assure you that they don't.

The

sophisticated ones don't understand that particular
subtlety, so there is a problem right there.

Whether the unsophisticated user of
financial statements, the individual investor that
just happens to own 70 percent of the interest of

American equity, I'll give you a written guarantee
he doesn't.

MR. MULLARKEY:

Initially we started

out with the concept that we thought it might be

misleading, and part of the misleading relates to the

fact that it takes a lot of sophistication to under
stand this.

Unless the disclosure standards are
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themselves adequate as to how we make our assessment,

then it is difficult for people to understand all those
subtleties.

MR. KEALY:

the case.

I think that's very much

I would also still revert back to my other —

even if we clear the air on that but certain auditors
operating with information with respect to the use of

the "Subject To" opinions that predates FAS 5 would
use a "Subject To" when they really shouldn't, et cetera.
If we clear all that up I still would come back to the

point that I think there is a subtle shift of — I would
worry about the disclosure question without some club,
and I am not sure that the "Except For" or the disclaimer

would be used often enough.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I think we need to

take a short break, but let me get —
MR. MULLARKEY:

Now we're going to have

the discussion between Board members.

MR. BAILEY:

I get confused.

I hear one

set of discussions in this general area indicating

that the sole purpose of "Subject To" is to drive
people to footnotes, and then another subset saying
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that the footnote disclosure isn’t adequate and therefore

we need —
MR. KEALY:
MR. BAILEY:

No, no, no.
Well, what I seem to hear

is that somehow the footnote disclosure must not be

adequate because the auditor has information apparently
that's not showing up in the footnotes, and this opinion,

which makes it kind of a unique opinion, has value in
itself, that somehow by putting the footnote "Subject

To" this is something that should affect your decision.
And I think it's one or the other. Are

we going to decide, are some of you going to state that
there is new information here that the auditors should

be involved in making these kinds of in a sense predic

tions, and that's the function of the auditor, or are
we going to say that this is a red flag, in which case
it's driving us to disclosure issues and the question of

disclosure, and "Subject To" it seems to me kind of

disappears when we. raise the question of do we have
adequate disclosure.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

want to discuss this

We really don't
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MR. BAILEY:

I know you don't.

MR. MULLARKEY:
examining that issue.
discuss it.

We spent three years

It isn't that we don't want to

We just don't happen to make decisions on

that.

MR. BAILEY:

But it seems to me that's

the issue, the nub of the disclosure issue, not —

MR. MULLARKEY: Well, to some people.
MR. BALL:

What is so wrong about

giving the public or a portion of the public a red flag

in addition to the disclosure?

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

It's back to the

same question as to what use are they putting it to
and do we have a commonality of understanding when you
put it to X use as an appropriate use for it, because

maybe you believe it's something we are not delivering.
MR. KEALY:

I still haven't had the

answer, and I don't know that there is a common answer,

because there may be twenty-five auditing firms involved
in the thirty-eight opinions that have been slapped with

a "Subject To" but if somebody in one of those operating
firms operating under misguided information or whatever
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has decided that there is either a probable or extra

special or super special, whatever the phrase was, mater

iality here, you might agree with if you were not doing
the audit — not agree with because you might be doing
the audit post FAS 5, but somebody felt that was

material or probable, then I think that's important to

know.

And I'd like to see more of that, not less of

that.

I mean —

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

There seems to be

a little confusion about the relationship between the
auditing requirement and the accounting standards.
The point that was made is that the current auditing

standards stem from the time when the accounting

standards didn't exist, so the framework we have for
a lot of reporting is based on a financial reporting

environment when we didn’t have the body of accounting
standards that we have today.

So all auditors are applying the current
auditing standards for audit reports.

some are.

It's not that

Some are in a misguided sense using them —

everybody has to use them.

The question that is being raised is
that the reporting framework that we have today, that
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was devised at an earlier time — the question is is that
still appropriate, given the new accounting standards that

we have?
So the auditing standards, the need to
express a "Subject To" qualification, developed at a time
when there was much less sophistication in financial
reporting and the auditor had to make judgments

about

the financial statements, and there was no guidance on

the accounting side about whether a contingency should
be adjusted for, approved in the financial statements,
or whether it should be disclosed, which ones needed to
be disclosed, and so on.

The accounting standards developed with

such broad probability items, saying when it was appro
priate to adjust the financial statements and when it was

wrong to adjust the financial statements.
Under the older accounting guidance the

word more or less was you adjust whatever you can adjust.
If you can determine that something is going to happen,

no matter how far out in the future it is, then you make
that adjustment today.

That changed, and the accounting rules
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changed, so that it's — not only was it recognized that
you had to make some distinctions in probability, it was
recognized that it was wrong to reach out too far into

the future, that there were certain things that should be

adjusted for and that other matters should only be

disclosed.
So how the probability adjustment — or
how the probability assessment, rather, should affect

the financial statement, whether the statement should be

adjusted or whether the matter should be disclosed, and
how the determination and the amount entered into that
was then spelled out in the accounting literature, so
the accounting standards that both preparers and auditors
have to use in evaluating financial statements now
include those probability adjustments or probability
assessments, whereas before they didn't include them,

the auditor had to make them.
So we now have accounting standards that

say,"You go through this probability valuation and to
the extent, using the best ability you have to make it,

that you can make it, you do. That is not incorporated

in the financial statements.
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The financial statements reflect

everybody’s best probability adjustments about contingen

cies and uncertainties.

That is the preparers, their

advisors, and that includes lawyers and auditors.

The probability standards that accounting

standards require are correctly reflected in the financial
statements.
Now the auditor is in the position of

having this old set of auditing standards in his report
that were devised at an earlier time when the treatment
of the probability adjustments in financial reporting
wasn't specified, so we have this old literature that

says that now that all those probability adjustments have

been made and reflected in the financial statements you
need to come along and make another assessment on top

of that.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

statement

I'd like to correct that

that statement five does solve contingencies.

There has been some presumption in the room today that

statement five addresses every contingency in the finan
cial statements, and it does not.

It specifically

excludes certain kinds of contingencies, for example,
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the right of operating assets.

There are some things

like that that are under consideration by the Board
today involving recognition and measurements issues that

have not been resolved, and it should not be presumed that
all contingencies have been evaluated by the auditor.

MR. KEALY:

I understand now very clearly

what you said about the auditing standards when they were

created, and the accounting disclosures.

I didn't under

stand it before this discussion.

I would guarantee you that users generally

don't understand that subtlety.

I think that should be

cleared up, no question about it.

And once we clear it up I still come back

to my observation that I don't like eliminating the
"Subject To" because I think there is utility and value,

and so on and so forth, and I think there is this different
information.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

We obviously are

going to come back to this same point because it's really

the only point we want to continue to discuss.

J.T. preempted something I was going to
say.

He had sort of directed us towards litigation
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earlier this morning.

I think it's easier to focus on

a type of contingency and to address the question we’re
discussing. There are obviously other forms of contingen
cies .
We by and large lumped uncertainties

together in the auditing environment and said, "However
although there are other forms of uncertainties the
distinction should not impact this question.”
That isn’t necessarily going to be

accepted, and it may be a little confusing to the people
that deal in the non-public company environment because
I think litigation is not necessarily — it does not

have the same frequency necessarily in non-public
environments.

Perhaps the going concern issue is the
more prevalent one in the non-public environment.

I’d like when we come back to talk about
what we have talked about in a non-public company to see

if there isn’t something we'd like to think about
differently for the non-public company or the govern

mental unit or whatever. I’m not sure the arguments
change at all, maybe they will or not, but I just want
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to make sure we don't overlook that.
The rest rooms are this way, down the

hall quite a long way.

(A recess was taken.)

MR. MULLARKEY: Just before the break
Jim Leisenring mentioned that he wanted to concentrate

some time after the break on non-public companies, just

in case we might have a different view.
Prior to that I would like to get some

observations from Chairman Knowles of the Ontario
Securities Commission, particularly as to the action
that was taken in Canada last year.

MR. KNOWLES:

Listening to the discussion

this morning I'm somewhat reluctant to make some of the
comments you made note of. In Ontario in Canada with

the CICA we’ve done away with the requirement for the

"Subject To" clause, after much debate, much of which or
some is the same as that here this morning.

And as I said to a gentleman during the

debate, listening to you, I feel that you'd like to
peel the skin off the banana when people are forced down

to the real issues such as your discussion with Mr. Greene
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Mr. Chairman, because he banged away when it came down
to what is an auditor’s statement, its function, and so

on.
Come back to that and deal with the layers

of sophistication, we are concerned in Ontario that if
we had carried on the way we were going that the audit
report would grow in proportion to the length of footnotes

that have grown in context with the actual length of the
financial statements, inasmuch as they all are one and
the same, like the prospectuses have grown.
The audit report would have to be a precis
of the statement of the issuer.

To deal with that issue we tried to go
back to what is the issuer's responsibility and what is
the auditor's responsibility, and we came up with the

view that the auditor's responsibility is not to provide

an easy walk-through of the financial statements but

determining what is most material of something that is
material, to point a finger for credit analysis at a
bank or to provide a chartered financial analyst with

a quick report that he can give back.
We

also tried to come to grips with

reality as the bankers and analysts are today, but we
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went a step beyond their surface comments by saying that
there is no chartered financial analyst in Ontario who
would rely on the "Subject To" as pointing to a signifi
cant difference in the notes.

There is no substantial credit lending

institution in Canada that would rely upon the "Subject
To" as the indication as to whether the credit should be

granted or denied in a particular loan application.
So the thing that we had to come to grips
with is who is the auditor and what is his job, and we
determined that the — a lot of the input we were getting
to maintain the "Subject To" and/or expand it came from
the basis — and this will sound strange from a regulator

— but from the basis of a distrust of the corporate

mentality in our country, and as I hear your comments

today, you have a basic distrust of the corporate
entity in your community, so you’re looking for additional

policemen and you're looking for additional people to

second-guess the producers, if you will, in your society

another layer.
We agree that you have to have policemen
and we agree that the policemen should have a rule. The
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rule book that we chose was the Chartered Accountants
Handbook in Canada, and we said, "Those are the rules."

If we allow a lot of individual assessment
by auditors then we’ve done away with the rule book and
we should go back to the historical analysis that you

went through with us and say, "There are no rules and

each auditor can choose for himself to say what he wants
to say and what the standards would say."
So we viewed the supplications that

you’re making to this body today as being destructive
of uniform standard setting, destructive in the sense

that you could lead to a particular situation if a
particular audit firm produces these "Subject To" clauses
that you mention you’ll get a shopping by issuers to those
that don't produce them.

One question that didn't seem to get

posed is if there is a "Subject To" clause in an audit

report and the stock price goes down in the context of

a public market and it turns out with hindsight that the

item was not material, is the auditor subject to suit?
I don't know the answer.

Our society is not as litigious as yours
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yet, so it probably would not happen in our society at

the moment, but having taken some of my training down

here and knowing some of the professors that taught me, I
can imagine that there would be those that would be able

to take such a lawsuit in the United States.

So the only thing I can really add of
benefit to you is that I think you have not come down to
grips with the real issues which the representative of the
American Bar tried to get you to focus down on, what it

is you are discussing, but I thought you had to go a
layer below that, which is why do you have financial

statements and whose are they and what is the responsibi

lity of the auditor?
If the chartered financial analyst is going

to make a report for Goldman Sachs or Morgan or anyone

like that, should he bear liability for not — if he

doesn’t point up something in the statement? Why pick on
the auditor to do other than say that the statements meet
the standards?
We ran into a couple of problems in

Ontario and in Canada, where we were getting close to
having different accounting standards in each province
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because of the what the regulators were doing, and

we’ve backed away from that because we were falling
into the trap I think you’re falling into by the

dependency you are placing on the "Subject To" clause
in that you do get down to subjective analysis, and that

ultimately would destroy your uniform standards.
I don’t know if I can be of much more
help to you on that, because we didn't deal on the same

level of sophistication, we tried to go down and recon
struct — the closest thing we did was to your historical
analysis, and then reconstruct what the roles should be

and the reports should be and who should bear responsi

bility.
MR. MULLARKEY:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Any comments on
Mr. Knowles' remarks?

MR. GREENE:

How long has Rule 2 been

in effect now?
MR. KNOWLES;

1980.

MR. GREENE: Is it too early to see the
results in having "Subject To" eliminated?

looked at that at all?

Have you

Do you have any plans to look at

65

that to see what the impact has been on the conduct of
preparers and users?

MR. KNOWLES:

study to look at it.

We have not instituted a

We have received no complaints from

the users of statements including sophisticated users.

We have had no complaints that there have been any
misleading statements go through, and rather than putting

out a force of policemen to look at the situation, we
are going to wait for the investment community to come

back to us, and no one has come back.
I think we also determined that the
thrust that’s been taking place here today on the "Subject

To" clause is too much a spoon feeding and that government,
by which I include the private associations as well,

where there are bureaucracies, are trying to hard to
make sure that the average person, whoever he is, because

he’s never in the room when you discuss it, will be

taken care of that you are removing all initiative and
his ability to think.
It’s the old problem we have with

socialism that’s been cradle to the grave, and now we're
trying to ensure that whenever you invest you're
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obviously assured of a return because there is no

statement out there that wouldn't lead you to invest

unless the stock was going to go up, and I think

somewhere along the line you'd have to draw the line
and say on a cost benefit analysis, "This issuer with
his auditors say these statements meet the standards,"

not any subjective analysis by the auditor, "You're
on your own, they meet the standards."

Somebody tried to bring that up today
and got sidetracked, but don't change the standards by

saying to the auditors, "Why don't you fiddle with them
a little bit."

And I think that's what's happening.
But no, a direct answer:

We are not going

to do any analysis, we've decided that we'll let our

investors take their lumps. If there are any problems

they can come back and complain.
MR. GREENE:

What I am saying is that also

means that you're satisfied with respect to disclosure

standards as contingent liabilities in FAS 5?

That

would be comparable.
MR. KNOWLES:

That's right.

We had one

conflict when we — in the removal of a "Subject To"
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clause which was put into effect.

Some people were not

satisfied that there had been sufficient public
education to the users statements, that the qualification

was going to be — that the opportunity to use the

qualification was going to be removed.

It had come

up in all the professional journals and was well done
that way, so we required that they either state the

change — change the contingency item on the basis of the

balance sheet or that the management put a note to it,up in front besides the auditor’s statement,saying that

there had been a change and that there were contingencies.
What we hoped they would do is that the

auditors would say there had been a change in their

standard procedures since the last annual report. We’re
still having that fight with the CICA only because they

move slowly, like all regulators do, and we are keeping

our ban on until they conform to the statements that
whenever there is a change in the substance and standard

setting that will be mentioned in the auditor's reports

in the year of change, so two years down the line it
no longer has to be mentioned because it's no longer in
the year of change.
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MR. GREENE:

Do most people go into the

clean opinion so that the "Except For" is not cropping

up at all?

MR. KNOWLES:
problem with us in Canada.

"Except For" is not a

Our auditors when they come

to an "Except For" situation in practice — and I was

in practice for 20 years — that’s so terrible that it

can be removed, the cause of the "Except For" is removed
and dealt with.

goes in.

If it can't be removed, the "Except For"

So I would say again we have no statistical

analysis because we don't keep track of it, but there's

certainly been no ground swell on that.
MR. GREENE:.

So most of the "Subject To's"

just become straight opinion?
MR. KNOWLES:

That doesn't bother us in

the slightest bit, because all the "Subject To" does is
tell you that there is a note.And people are supposed to
read the notes if they want to rely on the financial

statement.
With the gentleman with whom I was
discussing it earlier I said, "Our investors may not be

as sophisticated as yours, but our small investors aren't
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investors because they invest through pension funds, and

so on, so they invest with the benefit of that."
Our small investors are doctors and lawyers
and dentists.

Mostly they like to look at the glossy

pictures and then read the president’s letter, how

glowing it is, the company.

If he's very sophisticated

he'll look through the balance sheet and look at the
net worth side to see if there is a lot of money there,

then look to see if they made a lot of money or lost it,

and then make his investment.

Most of our investors invest because a
registered representative or investment dealer

has

phoned them up and told them to invest, they've got a
hot tip, in which case they're not going to

read the

financial statements anyway.
I say we did try to do it pragmatically

and as I say, we are concerned in my province, in my
country, that the degree of sophistication that's being

imposed upon the issuers of financial statements is getting

to the point where you have improper disclosure because
it's so sophisticated no one can really understand it,

and that it's putting a burden well beyond the cost. We'd
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be better off to have some people burned on investments

than the costs we're imposing upon them. We’re diverting
the human resources rather than their financial resources

away from the thing they're good at, doing their business.

So we're going to try it for a decade and
see where the lumps are.

MR. WATTERSTON:

The presumption is that

the disclosures are adequate, and I would take exception
to that.

We get in litigation and other types of

contingencies some fairly bland statements that usually
management and management's counsel believe that these

things will be resolved favorably.
What we want to know is what are the dollar

involved.

That's often not shown. What impact this

could have on the statements if they are resolved
adversely, and that's usually not shown.

So if we can be directed or rely on the
auditor to make a judgment that there is something there
that's potentially adverse, then at least we can delve

into it further, and we've all had the experience of
talking to companies after we've seen the "Subject To"
and read the notes, and we might find out a little more.
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So I don’t think that disclosures are

as complete as you're presuming them to be.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

I’d like to ask a

question that might be embarrassing.
during the break.

We had a discussion

Under FAS 5, and keeping in mind the

American Bar Association's fine policy statement on the

responses to auditors —

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

What was that,

fine policy statement?
MR. GREENE:

From a lawyer's point of

view.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

In the areas of litigation

it is regarded generally I think as rare that you get
a response from a lawyer who says the outcome is

probable to

be adverse to the company. Most of the time

you're dealing with the reasonable possibility type of
litigation.

Assuming though that you do get an

opinion like that and you can't estimate the outcome, and
you get an opinion from your lawyer and he says, "Well,

I'm going to tell you it's bad news" — I mean it's

tough to conceive of those facts — does GAAP operating

72

through FAS 5 or otherwise believe that a fair disclosure
or a fairness presentation would require that the

disclosure in the footnotes distinguish a litigation
where there was a probability of adverse outcome?
MR. LANDSITTEL:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Yes.

MR. PREWOZNIK: That was my assumption.

We couldn’t find that spelled out in FAS 5, but I couldn’t
believe it otherwise.

*
Again, if that's true, if that's true I
don't think — I think there's been a great misunderstand
ing on the part of users that the auditors are passing

judgment further on this issue.

MR. WATTERSTON:

What you're saying is

if the attorneys say the outcome is going to be adverse —
but you also said the attorneys seldom say the outcome

is adverse, so you have a Plaintiff and a Defendant
with both attorneys saying they're going to win, and we

know that can't happen.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

But are you looking for

the auditor to tell you something?

MR. LANDSITTEL: The auditor is not in a
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position to second-guess that judgment.
No, but just to say there

MR. WATTERSTON:

is potential major adjustment to the statements and —
MR. LANDSITTEL:

Well, that's a very

difficult responsibility for the auditor.

Once you

accept that the disclosure rules are adequate and then

ask the auditor to make a probability assessment with
those same facts, it goes beyond that.

MR. WATTERSTON:

Well, you've got a

lot of facts at your disposal that don't show up.
MR. KNOWLES:

change in standards?

Aren't you asking for a

You're saying that in the

financial statement that you would like to see there

should be a disclosure, a mandatory disclosure by
management, the bottom line if they lose and the top

line if they win.
MR. WATTERSTON:

I don't think that's likely.

Yes, I guess I am, but
There are a lot of good

reasons why managements don't want to disclose what these

outcomes are, because they don't want the other side
in these litigations to know.

So I guess I'd rather stay with the way
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we have it, let them be a little vague and have the

auditor: bring our attention to it.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

But what is it other

than "Be sure you read this note," that we admit is vague
and. not very meaningful, or at least we’re saying that,

what else does the auditor bring to put on your plates for

analysis, I mean, other than that "Be sure and read this"?
Do you think there is information content
in the mere fact he modifies his report?
MR. WATTERSTON:
and say it is.

I guess I would come down

On the one hand we say the statement

presents fairly, and so we're saying that the auditor has

some responsibility for the overall fairness of the
statements.

And then somewhere in the footnotes it says,

"There could be a major adjustment to these statements."
So how does that relate to fairness?

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

The fact that the

Board did not properly resolve the fairness issue when

it had the opportunity to earlier is not the subject.
MR. MULLARKEY:

One of the issues that has

come up in our discussion as it relates to this discussion
is if we were to retain the "Subject To" then we should
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describe the criteria more clearly that have existed for

some time, so that auditors can arrive at common decisions.

We're looking for that.

You don't want all different

decisions.
The difficulty in that investigation or

that articulation is the fact that as auditors we look to

GAAP to describe the situation and to make a determination

as to whether the disclosure is adequate, so we live within
the environment of the standards as they're set, and we
have always — and that's one of the reasons we're having

the discussion — we have always had difficulty among

ourselves trying to say that if we acknowledge that the
disclosure standards are adequate, how do we reach separate
decisions in such a way that we can articulate, having

agreed in the first instance that they seem to be adequate?
So I mean that was underneath the questioning
as it relates to the utility you get from it, how would we
look at whatever it is that we should generally articulate

when the accounting standards are what they are?
And many have made a statement that there

is more to it when the auditor gives a "Subject To" opinion
that is different, maybe different than what the GAAP
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requirements are, and we are stuck at that point, because

we use them too, we don't have another set.
MR. WATTERSTON: Well, I wouldn't underestimate
the difficulties that you face on this issue.

You know,

maybe we should change the standards. But until we do maybe

we ought to stick with the "Subject To."

MR. KINNEY:

In this area we're talking

about — I am not sure I heard fellow Board members answer
this correctly, as I understood the question a moment ago.

In the case of the litigation in which it is at least
reasonably possible that a materially adverse case may be
lost, the financial accounting standards require footnote

disclosure of this at least reasonable possibility, but it
doesn't require the management to say that "We expect to

lose this case."
In other words, they don't make this — they

say "It's at least reasonably possible there may be a

material adverse outcome," but not particularly "We're
going to lose the case."
Now, the auditing standards now indicate
the auditor should modify the opinion, should qualify the

opinion if he feels he or she, it's probable they’re going
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to lose the case.

This is a case where the "Subject To"

opinion is not really redundantwith the FAS 5 requirements,
because it goes beyond that, because it says, "Give a

separate signal if the problem is they're going to lose
this case."

Now the question is, from the public's

point of view, is that useful information and should

management be making these disclosures or should the
auditor be making these disclosures?

MR. CARMICHAEL:

And that is —

One thing you should add,

Bill, is while the literature does say that you cannot

estimate the amount but you've got to know that even
though you can't estimate it that it is at least

material and it’s probable there is going to be an
adverse outcome, then you need to qualify the opinion

subject to qualification, but that is the extreme, that's

the clear one.
MR. KINNEY:

That's right.

MR. CARMICHAEL:

Now, there will be other

cases where a "Subject To" opinion will be given below
that.
MR. KINNEY: That's correct.
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Where the adverse

outcome is reasonably possible, and those will also get
"Subject To" opinions.

So there isn’t anything that when the
"Subject To" opinion is given lets the reader of the

financial statement know —
MR. KINNEY:

—

MR. CARMICHAEL:

is.

Which it is.

— which "Subject To" it

It could mean that the adverse outcome is probable

and that "We don't know exactly but it's big," or it could

mean that it's a big amount, we don't know what the outcome
is but an adverse outcome is at least reasonably possible.

That whole spectrum is covered by "Subject

To."
MR. KINNEY:
solely on the auditor.

And the responsibility is

The management doesn't have to

say, "We expect to lose."
And with a stock price study it's useful

to know this but it's not part of accounting standards.
That's the question that's then discussed here.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

Bill and I discussed it

at the break, and I took issue with the comment that the
auditor takes responsibility for assessing probability.
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I think we’re both looking at this auditing interpretation

of January ’76.

I think he takes premises that are given

to him by the company and his lawyers about whether a loss

contingency, negative outcome, is reasonably possible to

probable, and then if the premise is reasonably possible
then the standard or the supplement, as I call it, to the

standard or interpretation says he might modify his

opinion.

What does that mean? God only knows.
It's an anachronism. I am absolutely

convinced that it is.
Then the other one says when the events
that will resolve a contingency are probable, i.e. likely

to occur, then the auditors should modify it.

But I don't

believe I've ever understood it but the auditor is making

that judgment as to probability.

He's taking that as a

presentation in accordance with GAAP in those financial
statements.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

It is not clear

whether that —

MR. PREWOZNIK:

I know it's not clear, and

it's not clear over here because I think some people over

here have the impression that the auditor is constructing
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the premise on its own, independent from the issuer, and

the company or the lawyers, and gosh —

MR. CARMICHAEL:

I don’t think the big

concern occurs when the auditor has reached the conclusion

that the adverse outcome is probable and I do think that
you’re right that the most likely reason that he would
have reached that conclusion is that the lawyer believes

this is one of those rare circumstances when he can say an

adverse outcome is probable.
So I think what was said before using the

probability framework that we’re given by statement five

is that between outcomes that are remote and probable, which

lawyers can opine on if they believe that the information
at hand permits it, there is a wide range called, "Reasonably
possible.”
That range is so broad that I would say
some of the comments before, using these terms, are saying,

"We want the auditor to pinpoint on that reasonably
possible range whether it's closer to probable than closer

to remote, we want something to give us more information
in this reasonably possible range, so we want the auditor

to be the one that says where on this scale the particular
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litigation lies."

MR. PREWOZNIK: Right.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Which I assume is not

something which most of us, I presume, are very capable
of doing.
MR. PREWIZNIK: And it’s not what your

literature has been telling you you are doing. Your
literature to me is just what we’re talking about, the FAS5

even

where you’ve got material, non-estimable, uncertain

MR. GREENE:

Even there are standards,

these are very difficult professional judgments to make
if you get into a contingent area in terms of possible,

magnitude, and so forth.
If you get into a question that suggests
the accountant is really involved in making these judgments

or not, because if you take it away the assumption is what
will happen to the conduct of the participants, and I

think the "Subject To" from the informational viewpoint
suggests,these flags to me suggest that these are very
difficult decisions to make in respect of these things.

When we deal with standards that are
fairly amorphous, I think in 5, I think the "Subject To"
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gives some comfort to people on that point.

I may be wrong

I am not a financial analyst, but I've been involved in the

process of advising, and I must say lawyers don't ever give
a yes or no; I mean lawyers have a variety of opinions.
I mean they can give you a "Free from doubt," "It's not

free from doubt," and so forth, they can scale down.
You basically are saying you've got to

go yes or no, and it's got to be clean, there aren't a
variety of judgments that can be made, and the "Subject

To" says if you can make it it's clear.

MR. FAULS:

If you can articulate what

auditors mean when they say "Subject To."

There's a story I heard about Ernie Byfield,

who ran the Ambassador East for some years, the Pomp Room,
for some 30 years.

a flaming sword.

I asked him why he served the meat on

He said, "The customers like it and it

doesn't hurt the meat so much."

So if you can articulate what you mean it

makes people happy.
MR. MULLARKEY: Could I ask how this is

actually used, how the "Subject To" is actually baked

into the investment advice that is distributed to people,
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on which they make investment decisions?
Or lending decisions.

MR. CARMICHAEL:

MR. MULLARKEY:

Or lending decisions.

Because I mean that must be what we’re looking for.

MR. KEALY:

Let me say this:

There have

been a lot of statements made about — this is not a

simmer process. The security analysts — let me talk for

the security analysts in the U.S., just like the security
analysts in Canada — do take responsibility for what

they say, do go through all published financial information
and then some. We do talk to competitors, suppliers,

customers and lenders, et cetera. And there is no assumption
that this is a specific process.
The only thing we do is wait till we see

a "Subject To" decision, opinion, make a sell recommendation
and go home, that is a gross oversimplification. Let me

just get that out of the way.
How do we use it?

We don’t use it in any way other than What
I’ve said and what's been said here, that it is one element

which directs us to probe somewhat further in one particular
aspect of the financial statements and disclosure of the
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particular issuer.

It doesn’t mean we don’t look at the other
footnotes, it doesn’t mean we don’t ask resilience questions

many of which are maybe useless or what have you, but you
know, it’s a flag, it is something which — we don’t write

a report at the end of which it says, "And oh, by the way,
this company had a qualified opinion."

I've never seen that in a published research

report.

I am not saying it doesn't exist, but I've never

seen it in a published report.
But it directs us, and there is a presumption

perhaps incorrect for technical reasons which I wasn’t

aware of, but there is a presumption that the auditor does
have more information and access to more people and an

ability to discuss these issues at greater length and

does step back, taking the opinions of counsel, taking
the opinions of the management, perhaps seeking other
opinions of other counsel or other observers

of the

scene, and reaches an independent conclusion, and

occasionally throws that "Subject To" or some of a
disclaimer or qualifier in there, and it is used by us as
a — you know, as a flag, no more, no less.
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It doesn't mean we don't look at the cash
flow statements and everything else.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

I think you're mentioning

two things, one of which makes me more edgy than the

other.

You know, pragmatically just the fact that it's a

matter of emphasis helpful to you I think is a legitimate

user benefit.
MR. KEALY:

I mean you get to it on Monday

rather than Tuesday, that particular issue.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

So just to say it directs

me in the right direction, if it's the right footnote, as an
emphasis, that's one thing, purely as a matter of emphasis
as a purported benefit. That doesn't disturb me quite as
much as the seeming reading between the lines and says,

"Yes, I heard what the footnote says, and the footnote

might say there is an uncertainty with respect to the

outcome, which typically is what the footnote will say
when there is an auditor's opinion as to that.

The footnote will not say typically that
the attorneys in the company believe that there is no

material meritorious contention by the Plaintiff.

I mean

typically the footnote will parallel the opinion and
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say that there is uncertainty because there it is, the
facts of what the attorneys and the management information
they’ve given to the auditor is, and it does bother me a

little bit that you assume that the auditor has — you
read between the lines more than that and say, "Yes, I

hear what the footnote says but I really know there is

more to it than that, that the auditor has more information,"
and that is a role that, number one, I don't think is
quite factually correct, because typically we don't have
any more than what we honestly want to have fairly

summarized in the footnotes, and secondly, even if it were

to be correct, it would be a type of responsibility that
makes me uneasy to accommodate, because I think it was

said by Jerry a little earlier that it's not necessarily
our role to go that far, even if that were to be a user

need, because disclosures are inadequate.
MR. KEALY:

Well, I can understand fully,

you know, why the acceptance of the responsibility — or

the unease necessary with respect to that responsibility,

which is awesome. I fully respect that and agree that
that's an awesome responsibility,and perhaps an inappropriate

responsibility in the context of what is the role of the
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auditor.
I also believe — and again we can distinguish
between reality and presumptions here, but my presumption,
and I think shared by many people, is that the auditor

with respect to the issuer is in possession of more
information, maybe not better, maybe not — you know,
I can believe that you're in our offices continuously,

talking to people continuously, and you don't have more
information than a security analyst who shows up Tuesday
and gets an hour with the public relations guys?

MR. MULLARKEY: Well, listening to what
you're saying, it's more information, it's relevant, and
it's not disclosed.

Isn't that all true?

MR.KEALY:

Well, that I don't know. I can't

say that it's all relevant.

A lot of it is irrelevant.

A lot of the information that we gather
and seek so assiduously is irrelevant too, and —

MR. MULLARKEY: Well, you're deducing

something out of it, which must mean it's not disclosed
when you read it.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

I think the auditor would

believe that the responsibility is to make sure that all
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of that voluminous information, that that part that is

material has to be properly summarized independent of the
issue of the "Subject To" opinion.
MR. IVES:

I think there is —

MR. GRIMMIG:

I’d like to say this:

I

think it takes a lot of guts for the auditor to put that

"Subject To" in his first page rather than Page 42,
and I think the credibility he gets from the banker

that he’s raising this red flag in Page 1 and not in a
disc
losure in Page 42 makes a better impression on the
banker, and the banker then sees that the auditor perhaps

is more independent of his customer, and you've got a

different credibility viewpoint from the banker or the

lender.
MR. CARMICHAEL:

How does that affect what

you do, would that lead to more loans for people with
"Subject To" opinions?

MR. GRIMMIG:

I think it would probably do

that, yes, because we would make a decision, one of

perhaps perception of greater independence and guts on
the part of the auditor, and two, we would go back to the

company and to the auditor, if we had the company's concern
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and get additional backup.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Well, then I’m doing

a disservice to my clients if I don’t give them a ’’Subject
To” opinion when they have a significant uncertainty,

because they have a better chance in the financial market;
is that what you’re asserting?

MR. GRIMMIG:

I think possibly so.

A SPEAKER:

At least with Chemical Bank.

MR. JONES:

I think there is a great

misconception about the auditor’s responsibility. Management

has the responsibility for preparing those financial
statements. The auditor's responsibility lies within

stating an opinion on whether or not those financial
statements present fairly the financial position and

results of operations in confirmity with general accepted
accounting principles.

Now, from what I understand you’re saying,
the auditor is going to look at more if he has to "Subject
To” that opinion for a contingency rather than if he stated

an opinion, you know, from the fair presentation of those
numbers.
That’s not true.

As an auditor that
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individual is going to look at the very same information,
you know, regardless of whether or not a "Subject To"

opinion exists, versus an "Except For" because he’s going
to look to see that that note in the financial statement

presents fairly what is happening.

And if he in his opinion or his judgment
thinks that note does not provide adequate disclosure then

he is going to "Except For," and you know, say, "Except

For, I believe that this note does give adequate disclosure,"
and give what is his opinion of what should be adequate
disclosure in the opinion.
And you’ve got as much information, you

might even have more under the "Except For" concept than you

would the "Subject To."
MR. WATTERSTON:Well, you might, but I'd
still go back to the statement I made earlier that if the

footnotes contain potential material adjustment to the

financial statements, I find it difficult to understand
how an auditor can say on Page 1 that the statements

present fairly.

They do subject to the outcome of this

and how it might adjust the statements.

MR. JONES:

Well, they do at a point in
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time, and you know, we're not predicting the future. As a

matter of fact, ethics prevent auditors from predicting

the future.
But his responsibility lies, if his year-end

is 12/31, in whether or not those financial statements
present fairly at that point in time.

Now, if something comes to the auditor's

attention subsequent to that time but before the issuance

of his opinion, then he would be required to give you
additional disclosure.

As a matter of fact, if something came to
his attention even after the opinion was given, that would

— additional information that would lead

him to believe

that those financial statements were not fairly presented,
then he would be required to give you additional disclosure

in separate letter.
MR. LANDSITTEL:
MR. HUFF:

Bruce?

I've listened closely to the

investment analyst approach and the information there, and

I've heard some comments from the banking community view,

and I'd like to address this question to Mr. Huntington.
I'm really enthralled with the approach
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described, because I

deal mainly in a non-public setting,

and many of your decisions, a large portion of the

numbers of decisions, are made in that region, and I'm

curious because I know that a lot of our client situations,

not much different than anybody else, a lot of the

information presented to the bank is unaudited information.
If we have that information sometimes a
part of it is internally developed information,and in
those cases there is a lack of any disclosure regarding

contingency, and in fact, most of the bankers knowledge
from what I have seen in many of our experiences comes

from drinks they had at the country club or some dinner

that they had.

I mean I'm not going to be facetious, it's

my perception of what I understand that the bankers really

gather information from, knowledge of the client and the

customer, in really obtaining an in-depth knowledge there.

My real question is I'd like to pursue
the lending aspect, having heard a lot about the investment

the lending aspect.
I haven't heard any description of how one

would use the qualified opinion that is there as a tool to,

maybe from a checklist standpoint, indicate that we’ve got
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a problem there.

I have not seen that necessarily in the

dealings that I have had, and I guess I’m moving toward

the non-public sector, but I'm curious, Mr. Huntington,

as to what your comments would be on the decision process.

MR. HUNTINGTON: Well, the decision process

of lending officers varies with lending officers. There is
no clearcut way to say that every lending officer is
guided by the same signals, the same information data

has been set.
But I think it is clear that wherever there

is a report of an auditor containing a "Subject To" clause

that it's a clear red flag and it does trigger additional
inquiry into the contingencies or uncertainties pointed out
Now, you're asking me in instances where

there is not an auditor’s report?
MR. HUFF:

No, let's just stick with the

auditors, keeps it more simple.
What I am really curious about, that's
used as a red flag list in those situations — you said

that it's used as a red flag to lead you to further

inquiries, I assume of other customers —
MR. HUNTINGTON:

No, you would go back to
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management, possibly, if management gives you permission,
to discuss with the auditor why he enumerated that
particular one in his report, then you’d pursue that as

well.
MR. HUFF:

To go beyond the financial

statement disclosures or the auditor’s reports?
MR.HUNTINGTON:

It certainly tips you off

that in the auditor's opinion there is a material

uncertainty or contingency threatening, perhaps even
the continuation of the* business.

MR.HUFF:

Sure.

Because the description made

earlier of the analysis approach where the footnotes are
not really delved into too deeply in all cases, unless the

red flag is raised, is that an accurate description?

MR. HUNTINGTON: I think it varies

considerably with bank size.

Mr. Grimmig represents a

very large firm where they obviously are making use of
computer-assisted statement analysis, and I am sure there

are people who are reading and carefully looking at the
footnotes, but there are many, 14,000 plus banks, out
there that don't have quite that degree of sophistication.
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People are busy, they're looking as carefully
as they can at those statements.

I think the more important point may be

rather than trying to analyze how any one particular

lending operation would function or react to a "Subject To"

opinion is the fact that clearly the studies that I think
have been reviewed show that there is utility in this,

the "Subject To" clause is useful to lenders in their

analysis of the information and —

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

It’s fair to say

there are studies that say it isn't true.

I wouldn't

characterize them all that way.
MR. HUNTINGTON:

Most of the ones I saw

did prior to its usefulness.

Now, again the point is maybe improper

inferences are given, and I would not disagree that we need
— that we would benefit by some more education.

I guess

a question I'd like to throw out for consideration is

given FAS 5 and fuller disclosure in the footnotes, there

was a point prior to the summation of those standards where

it was felt that this was a proper role for the auditor to
call to the attention of the user, the reader, these material
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uncertainties and contingencies.

And why just because the

standards are clearer are you saying that was an invalid
perception of his role once way back there?
MR. CARMICHAEL:

MR.HUNTINGTON:

No, audit reports —

No?

In other words, if

we're all trying to make use of these statements, in our

case to allocate capital in the most constructive way,
and this is a useful signal to a user and reader of the
report, I'm a little concerned that we're trying to get

rid of something that is at least perceived by us, maybe

erroneously, as something useful.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: That's a real concern.

I just missed that.

MR. CARMICHAEL:

By historical analogy,

audit reports are frequently — if you go back far enough
you'll find audit reports that disclose the company's

capitalization policy and fixed assets in the audit
report.

At the time there were no accounting
standards on what fixed costs should be capitalized at and
whether or not depreciation should be taken.

That was an

issue, and when it was an issue audit reports disclosed
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those things.

We've come a long way since then, and the
issue is are we in that sort of situtation with uncertainties

do we have accounting standards that spell out how you
treat them and how you disclose them so that what was
the function that the auditor served by reporting on them

is now redundant and now may be misunderstood because
people think they’re getting a message from it that really

isn't there.

MR. LANDSITTEL:

I think historically it's

always been a controversial role, but absent the standards
that we now have, there seemingly has

been more of a

benefit to the assumption, however controversial, of that

goal than there might be perceived to be today when we

do have the standards that drive the disclosure and the
accrual to a possibility assessment that is required apart
from relying on the auditor's report.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Can I ask what I haven't
thought of before, but when Mr. Jones pointed out, properly
so, the distinction between the preparer's responsibility

for financial statements and the auditor's responsibility
for his opinion there, it dawned on me that perhaps you
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people think something that I hadn’t thought of before,

so I’ll just ask this question:

When a "Subject To"

opinion exists on an uncertainty, is that an implication
to you that there is a disagreement with management?

MR. KEALY:
an implication.

I would say yes, that there is

And there is a presumption that there is -

MR. LANDSITTEL:

Disagreement with respect

to the disclosures or disagreement with respect to —
MR. KEALY: No, with respect to the material.
I realize everything is material, and you know, the super

materiality or the probability, I would say that that is a

very possible presumption. I can't say it's universal.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: What caused me to

believe that was Mr. Grimmig's comments with respect to

do we have a more independent auditor than the standards
allow because he modified an opinion. Do you believe
that these uncertainty modifications were "Subject To"
opinions and disagreements?

MR. MEBUS:

We've seen cases where the

managements said that the auditors had to do it, but
first of all we're not going to lose, and secondly, it's
not going to be material.
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We’ve also seen cases where management told
us, you know, "We know it’s coming," and they understand
why it's coming.

So it has varied.

MR. WATTERSTON:

In response to the question

I would say as faras I’m concerned it does not imply that.

MR. HUNTINGTON:
question in

I think there is a burning

a lot of people here now as a consequence of

this last discussion, and that is both the bankers and
the analysts and the SEC when you see a "Subject To"

opinion.

The comment was made over here, "What do you

do?"

One of the things you said you do is you go

to the auditors.

Now, my question is do you ask them

why they went "Subject To" and if so what kind of answers

do you get? That to me is very important as to how you're
making use of this.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
any said auditors.

I'm not sure that

I mean they didn't, they said company.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

But the auditor is the

one who made the judgment. To me the obvious question, if

you're really fascinated by this "Subject To" language, one
of the honest things to do, one of the most important may be

100

in terms of diligence of your client, is go ask them. If

the company says, "Go talk to my auditor, and ask him why
did you go ’Subject To,'" and the first question is do you
ask those questions?

If not, what's this all about, and

if so, what kind of issues do you

dredge up by asking

those questions, because to me that will tend to indicate

the value that you're getting out of this "Subject To."
If the only value is that it's drawing

your attention to a particular matter in the footnotes,
I'm not, again, sure there is a heck of a lot of value.

But I'm more interested in what kinds of

answers you get from auditors.

MR. BAKER:

I think the inference you are

raising came from part of Bill's observations about

"Subject To" is triggered to do more analysis, and then
a list of all possible sources.
On a personal level I've never found it

very productive to approach auditors, because you never

find out any more than they already have been willing to

say.
On the "Subject To" if it's a litigation
matter it's been more productive to go to an outside counsel
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and try to get some third-party opinion on what the

relevant issues are that are involved in the probabilities

associated with how it's likely to be resolved.
Is that enough?
MR. PREWOZNIK: No, I think that — I've got

to tell you, the auditors must have reasons when they go
"Subject To."

I mean they're operating — to the extent

that we have these statistics here, it seems to me when an

auditor writes a "Subject To" opinion if I'm sufficiently
anxious about the implications of it I

would pursue why

he's done it.

MR. GRIMMIG:
out again.

Let me perhaps stick

my neck

On two occasions that I've known of — and

I'm not a line officer — on the two occasions that the

line officer went, they are now in litigation.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

You've got to give me a

little more than that.

MR. GRIMMIG:

Simply that —

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I don't think the

auditor is the Plaintiff in these circumstances, is he?
MR. GRIMMIG:

No.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I thought I'd point
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that out.

MR. BAILEY:

I come back again:

It does

strike me that what's coming through is that there is a
strong belief that somehow the disclosures are inadequate

and the signal being provided through the "Subject To"
has additional information in it. And if that's true,— and
I don't think some of the auditors believe that that should

be the case, but if that's true, then I'd say that my
personal opinion is that is an inappropriate role for the
auditor to play.
What you're asking for is analysis and

prediction from the. auditor.
Mr. Grimmig's point there is in a sense

that he's looking for an efficiency of search.

It leads

to kind of a ranked footnote approach, put the first
important footnote first, the second second. Then you

won't have to read the opinion, just start with your
first footnote and

work your way down.

That's the

sort of presumption.
I don't think that that analysis and

prediction role is an appropriate role.

It doesn't

strike me that the efficiency of search issue is one
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that public accountants ought to be saddled with, in any

case that the auditing profession ought to be saddled with.
On the other side there seems to be — if
the presumption is that the disclosure is inadequate,

while they don't want to discuss it here, it strikes me

that the question is an issue of disclosure, it's an
auditing issue.

I'm basically arguing that I think it is

an inappropriate role for the auditor to get involved in
the analysis and prediction issue.

If you don't believe

there is an adequate disclosure, it seems to me that there

there is another forum to approach that issue, certainly
not this one.

A related question is do you think that the
auditors — I guess you do think that the auditors with
this additional information are better predictors than
you would be if you analyzed the financial statements as
a whole, including all of the footnotes, which they presume
to be all-important, otherwise some of them would not be

there.
Do you think the auditors are better
predictors?
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MR. BAKER:

I think the question raised is

representative of much of the discussion here this morning.
It contains a compound presumption, the two parts of which

involve a non-sequitur.

The first issue is does the

existence of the "Subject To" opinion in the first place
have use to users, and the sum total of all that's been

discussed today comes down to, as I hear it, unanimity on
the part of the users committee that there is some use.
The second is is the use sometimes abuse
or misuse of the information? And I find that not nearly as

germane to the issue of whether or not "Subject To" should

be included or should not be included — should be possible
or not possible.

I think they are separate questions.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Except that that use -

Go ahead, I'm sorry.
MR. KNOWLES:

It seems to me that there is

a non-sequitur in your reply, in that I listened to the

comments from CPA's and from the banking community other
than Mr. Grimmig, who had a different use for the thing.

It was that the very premise of your use is being denied
by the people that are preparing the reports. They're
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saying "We understand you use it as a ranking, some place

to go, and so on," but they’re saying it's not, it has not
anything to do with it, so the premise that the user

community is basing its use upon is wrong.
MR. BAILEY:

MR. BAKER:

Either the auditor or —
I think it is an inference

there based on an element in the discussion which is not
nearly a complete statement of the possible uses of the
information.

The question is if the "Subject To" opinion

exists will investors use that in some productive fashion,
and I think everybody here has said yes, they’ll find some

use for it.

Some of them have described how they would
use it, and you've said that's a misuse or it's redundant

or it’s ambiguous, it won't be useful to everybody, and
all that.

I say that's beside the point.

Some investor

do find it useful, and they'll find the proper way to use
the information, and that's the criteria by which the
decision should come down as to whether it should continue

or not.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

But I think once you
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say yes, you should use it, you then jump and say that use

is a productive one.

We have some concern that you only

believe it's productive — and in fact it shouldn't be —

because you have a misconception as to not just the utility
but what you perceive to be the utility —

MR. BAKER:

Well, then let's move to a

region that's never been discussed here today, and I think
this is a relevant use of it:

The business trade press,

magazines, newspapers or whatever will frequently latch

on to a "Subject To" and use that as a basis for some

investigative reporting, and some attention will be
directed to an issue that otherwise never would have been

noticed had it been a footnote item fully disclosed but
not emphasized, and I think that's useful for many

investors in the economy.
MR. MULLARKEY:

How do you use it, how do

you bake it into your advice?

MR. BAKER:

The "Subject To"?

MR. MULLARKEY:

Yes, it's being used, so

we could be more specific as to how it really changes
something.

It would be really helpful.
MR. BAKER:

To go beyond the question of
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use as a trigger to further analysis I don’t think I can

give you a succinct answer, because there are too many
different ways that your analysis will be led down

different paths to try and understand the issue that's
been called to your attention.
And you don't necessarily do as much

analysis on every single footnote item.
MR. MULLARKEY: Well, the question that
I guess I'm piggybacking on, because I think it's still
open, is the question of going back to management or

going to the auditor to gather additional information which
was stated, or if that doesn't happen with the use of the

"Subject To" what exact use do you make of it?
MR. KEALY:

perhaps some others.

You go to all of the above and

I mean I agree with Dave's comment

that often the auditor that prepared the statement that
included the "Subject To" opinion is the least productive

line of inquiry.

I can't cite specific chapter and verse

of specific issues, but I know that in general that is

another presumption.
MR. MULLARKEY: So what do you get out of

management?
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MR. KEALY:

So we'll go back to the

management on that issue, use our own auditors, not

necessarily the auditor that prepared the statement,
and ask them what's going on.

If it's a litigious matter we might go
to our law firm, not their law firm, and we may not get
more information but we believe the process of due diligence

has been exercised by going through that loop ourselves.
And I doubt — I really do also strongly wish to raise

issue with the inference that all we're doing here is
seeking some prioritizing of footnotes and that we're

trying to make our jobs easier.
That's kind of not fair.

I mean it is

something that we'll get to on Monday instead of Tuesday,

but we're going to get to everybody in the process of

looking at the security.

I mean it's not — I don't want

the inference to be left on the table that all we do is

look at those items where there has been a "Subject To"

opinion or we look at that, you know, 50 times more
carefully than anything else.

MR. LANDSITTEL:

MR. MULLARKEY:

We do have to stop.

But we are still looking
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at his question.
MR. KEALY:

We go to the management, we

go to the auditors in question, and get most often very-

little. We go to auditors and ask why might this have

occurred, what light could you shed on it, and we go to
counsel, if it's a litigious matter.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

Have you ever found anything

in your own inquiries that led you to or your own auditor
to conclude that the material in those financial statements
was materially inadequate or unfair?

MR. KEALY:

I am trying to stay away from

the disclosure question per se.

I am trying to —
I am talking about user

MR. PREWOZNIK:

information. I mean that's a functional question in terms
of what's fair for disclosure in financial statements. I

am saying have you ever found anything that you felt
should have been in that note

MR. SAMPSON:
MR. PREWOZNIK:

and wasn't?

We have.
That was my next question,

does the SEC ask questions when they see "Subject To"?

MR. SAMPSON: We ask questions of the company,

not of the auditor, and we have found situations where the
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disclosure was inadequate.

Might have been triggered by

the auditor himself.
But in selective review we use that "Subject

To" as perhaps something we should look at to see if the

disclosure is adequate.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Did you ever find one,

though, a case where the footnote was not also inadequate

where there was a "Subject To" and you followed up and
found out that it was, you know —

I'm not sure I followed

MR. SAMPSON:

your question.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

Well, you said that you

weren't sure whether when you followed up on these "Subject
To's" and you thought that there should be additional
information — the question is would you have made that

followup without the "Subject To"?

I mean, if you had read the footnote.

MR. SAMPSON:

The answer would generally be

yes, if we had sufficient manpower.
MR. HODGES:

The question is sometimes —

MR. PREWOZNIK: Well, you're using the
auditors then

or the manpower of the government to help
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you.

MR. GREENE:

Wait a minute.

I would like to

respond. There is not this compartment between auditing and
And there is a real problem

accounting, they're related.

with 5. We have expressed our view about that.

I've

suggested there are problems, and it's a heavy problem.

The question is should the Commission go forward with the
change.

It's a question of who has the burden, and it's

not a question of the government sort »of inventing the
system.

It's there.

We find it very helpful, we find it basically
helps the quality disclosure, because of the Draconian

consequences you simply cannot finance in the market, and

if our overall objective is an equal disclosure, we I think
are relatively satisfied with the result, given the

tension

between auditing and accounting standards, and I

think if you don't change 5 then I think it's hard to change
this system, because I think to me they are inextricably

related.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

You said the Commission has

problems with 5?
MR. GREENE:

Sure.
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MR. PREWOZNIK:

In this area here what is a

key problem that the Commission has?

MR. GREENE:

I think one of the key problems

— go ahead.

MR. SAMPSON: There are different views on

the staff as to 5.

There are some people on staff that

think there is some problem with 5, moreso than perhaps I
might.

I think you can amend 5 and probably improve it,

but I don’t think you can amend it in a way which will take

care of its problems.

You simply can’t write a standard

which will result in adequate disclosure.
MR. THOMPSON:

Have you talked to the FASB

about amending 5, and what was their reaction?

MR. SAMPSON:

I don’t know, we’ve talked to

the FASB at times about 5, and the thing that Ed is

referring to is a recent report, and I don't believe there

has been any expansive discussion since that report.

Certain staff members believe it should be
pushed much harder than I personally do.

severe deficiencies involved.

I don't see the

That is not to say that the

disclosures that come about as a result of 5 and its

interpretation are always good, they're not.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

When you say the

disclosure is not always deficient, deficient in accordance

with 5, or is it the question that you believe it should
go beyond 5?

MR. SAMPSON:

No, no, in accordance with 5.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

So you're saying that

the auditors gave an inappropriate opinion because it

sure should have been "Subject To," it should have been
"Except For"?

*
MR. SAMPSON:

That would have been the

logical question.

MR. J.T. BALL:

Our discussions with the

Commission since 5 has been issued have typically been
that the disclosures required by 5 and by Interpretation
14 were not being given, not that the disclosures required

by 5 and 14 were in some way deficient.
MR. PREWOZNIK: Well —
MR. MULLARKEY:

I’m just going to make a

point here because — I mean the point that I want to make

is a simple point that we eventually have to go to lunch

if we have to come back at one.

But I don't want to cut

the discussion off if you think we can finish it off, then
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go to lunch.
So you get five more minutes and then go to

lunch.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

I have an instinct that

somehow if the user of "Subject To" is the tip

of an

iceberg in some cases, it seems to me this is a view we’ve
expressed in our own small ad hoc group in the ABA, and
isn’t it possibly true that if you removed that "Subject
To" gimmick that you will encourage those who would

otherwise have used it as somehow a mechanic to avoid

facing up to the disclosure, in fact that you would
thereby eliminate that and then they will be forced — the
issuers, the lawyers and the auditors — to apply themselves

to the only source that they can comply with, which is the
GAAP disclosure in accordance with FAS 5.

MR. SAMPSON:
MR. PREWOZNIK
MR. SAMPSON:

That’s the assertion.
Isn’t it a possibility?
It's a possibility, but I

don't feel it to be a strong possibility.

MR. PREWOZNIK

How about remote, and so on

and so forth?

MR. KINNEY:

Reasonably possible?
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MR. MULLARKEY: Okay, I'm not going to take
any of the questions.

Let me just say something about lunch.
Lunch is upstairs, and it's for everyone

we knew were coming, so it's for everybody at the table

and all the advisors they told us were coming, but we

didn't plan for everybody.
We are going to reconvene at 1:00.

MR. LANDSITTEL:

Including advisory

personnel who we knew were coming?

MR. MULLARKEY: That's correct.
Well, you probably know better than I do if
you were coming.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 P.M., a luncheon
recess was taken.)
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AFTERNOON

SESSION

1:00 P.M.

Okay, we’re going to

MR. MULLARKEY:

discuss at this time what we mentioned earlier.

We’ve

never gotten to it yet, but we would like to focus in

distinguishing the public environment from other environ
ments . We did say we wanted to stress that, see if it
might be different, get some comments, and I think we might

start off with the governmental environment and then work

down to the pure environments.

MR. FAULS:

You aren’t inferring they are

impure, are you?

MR. BROADUS:

I’m not sure that the

problems are any different really, but in that light let me

back up and tie a couple things in — I think they apply
to government as well as the private sector.

You know if anybody is for disclosure it's

probably the governmental people. We may overdo it. And
you know, going back to FAS 2, in my opinion at least, in
part that helped the field with some disclosure that wasn’t

in the accounting field, and since then FAS 5, whether it
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does not do enough, we need not debate that, I think we
could debate that the rest of the day.
So then why do we continue with that

subject?
Let me say I can't give you a research report,

I can only say in my working with state and local affairs

for about ten years, and CPA's, I'm not sure that the
auditors clearly understand what a "Subject To" opinion

happens to be.

I within the last week met with two different
groups of auditors, the same circumstances, one would have
had a "Subject To," one would have had "Except For," using

the same FAS.
I suspect that all around the room you get the

same thing, and I'm talking about a wide span there, not
a close one,— we've always got the judgmental type thing

there.
I heard a lot of that come out today that

even auditors

may

be

giving different things when they

say "Subject To."
On the other side the recipients, the

users of those "Subject To" opinions, certainly look at it
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from a different view.

One thing says it's an opinion, a

projection? one says its nothing more than "Look at Page 6."
A wide range.

When you've got both the auditors and the

users not really knowing what "Subject To" says, you've

got some problems, you've got some stuff thrown in a big

barrel.
I think there are two options.

I don't

think that in GAO,General Accounting Office, we'd have any
problem doing away with "Subject To." And I think you

could argue the case both ways, take it either side and
win, because there are good arguments on both sides.

But I think we certainly would support doing

away with it.

Also if it remains I think we'd support that
you'd have to set forth criteria so that the auditors

would have better information on what they're supposed to
do when they issue that thing, and also on the other side

the users of that must know what we're coming through
with forthwith.

So I think if we keep that, all right. If
we do away with it, then I'm not sure what would happen.
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I don’t see the problems being much different in the
governmental sector, state, local and federal.
I do know because in government, especially
state and local, that we have some more serious problems

and we need to go farther in this area, I think in the area

of going in accordance with GAAP, it may be that they aren’t
even following GAAP, so that may be another situation.

Not even all states and localities today are required to
follow GAAP, and it may be a long time before they are

required, so we have got a lot of problems.
We don’t have the same problems with

"Subject To" that the private sector has.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
companies?

How about private

Is there literally a distinction, or are the

issues any different from the lending officers' standpoint

when you're dealing with the public company rather than a

non-public?

MR. GRIMMIG:

Say that again, please.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

We know, or we

discussed the elimination or non-elimination of the "Subject
To" and the perceived utility of it or lack of utility of

"Subject To," but do the issues change or do your opinions
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change when you’re dealing with a private company evironment

as opposed to the public company environment?
MR. GRIMMIG:

I think not.

MR. WATTERSTON:

I think not. I don’t think

there is any difference really between public and private

companies, and that goes right down through the auditor’s
report, the accounting principles and the other standards

that are set, because we're looking at balance sheets,
income statements and the rest, and it doesn't matter how

many shareholders they have.

MR. GRIMMIG:

I think there may be a slight

difference because a public company that's represented on
one of the stock exchanges that has filing requirements with

the SEC has probably one of the Big 8 auditing it.

The

tendency is, I guess, to give them a little benefit of the

doubt compared to the non-public company that doesn't have
the checks and balances perhaps of an SEC filing requirement

or perhaps not one of the Big 8, not even one of the Big

200, on it.
So I think there is probably more of a

harder look, perhaps, at a non-public company.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Would you consider
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in Canada making a distinction between public and non-public
MR. KNOWLES:

No, we feel that in the

raising of capital with the non-public companies a banker

probably has a more intimate knowledge of the actual
operation and personnel and is better equipped to make

a judgment than with the public companies in many instances,
because of the intimate knowledge he has of the affairs of
the particular issue.
So that was not a concern with us.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: The fact that the

uncertainty changes there, would that make a difference?

Most of the "Subject To’s" in the non-public environment
are over continued asset realization and continued existence

circumstances.

At least we think that's the case.
As opposed to litigation.

Does the nature

of the uncertainty cause you to feel differently?
MR. WATTERSTON:

I don't know. I mean you

think that these "Subject To's" are different for private
companies, or do we have some statistics that we can look

at?

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I think we don't have

statistics because it's tough to retrieve, Jim.

It's more
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Board members’ perceptions that when they're dealing in

the private environment the incidence of "Subject To" is

more often — the reason for it is more often the going

concern issue as opposed to litigation, which appears to
be the most common one in the public environment.

MR. MULLARKEY: Yes?

MR. GREENE:

I think there may be a

de facto situation between public and private.

Unless

the Commission is prepared to accept "Except For" filings
I don't think it's an alternative for a publicly-held
company.

So that you say that's an option for an auditor,

but that in a sense puts the public company out of business

for all intents and purposes, and I am not sure whether —

that has come up from time to time — as to what your
requirements for financing under the 1933 Act and the Act of

1934 are, but that's a problem because that's a factor
that comes to bear on judgments that are to be made.

They can't ignore that.
I don't know how the Commission adjusts
that, whether in Canada the Commission has restrictions

on the kinds of financial statements that can be used to
advance
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Our restriction is that the

MR. KNOWLES:

accounting GAAP is the law, and you break the law if you

don’t make your statements in accordance with GAAP.

I

would have no trouble authorizing a financing if there
was a legitimate reason for not complying with GAAP in a
particular instance.

MR. GREENE:

Have you done that before?

MR. KNOWLES:

No, we've had it come up a

couple of times, but they backed away from it.
But I would think you could find situations

particularly in the area of Mega projects, where perhaps
GAAP might not be considered to present fairly the

financial situation, and that we had talked about it in

one of our cases, the Seagram's case, that there is an
overriding consideration in the Ontario, in the Canadian

handbook that says that the auditor's first duty is to
ensure that the auditor's statements present fairly the
financial position, and if he's prepared to go on and say
that GAAP won't do that, then we rely on that.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

I was just going to say, Ed,

that I don't see that the elimination of "Subject To" would
compromise the financial requirement aspects of the 1933 Act
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particularly because the "Subject To" if it is used —
even now the reason that it's permitted is because it's
not based on a departure from GAAP or a limitation on

scope, and the proposal contemplates that that distinction
would be preserved, so to the extent that elimination of
the "Subject To" assumed that the financials will continue

to present in accordance to GAAP and that there will be
no limitation on scope, I don't think you should assume
an invitation to the use of "Except For's" in place of
"Subject To's" because the proposal as I read it expressly

addresses that issue and says that that will not happen,
it should not happen and will not happen.

And you should have no additional scope
limits or non-GAAP problems after this is adopted than
you would now.

So we considered this issue in our little
ad hoc group and we felt that that's absolutely the case.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Tom, you represent a
non-public company, or your constitutents include that.

Do you see a need for us to try to make a distinction?
MR. FAULS:

They see no logical distinction

between the two. They felt, private companies and the very
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small public companies feel that they are more likely to
be caught up in the "Subject To" environment — the private

companies particularly — for reasons of growing concern,

perhaps, because they are small, they are new, they are
entrepreneurial and they are probably more risky than
Fortune 500 companies.
You may argue that point these days, but

at least their perception is that they are in a region that is
likely to be more affected by whatever the Board decides to

do than the larger companies.
There will be more of them.
But they don’t see any reason, at least

the ones I’ve talked to don't see any reason to distinguish

between the two in making a decision.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Does the Commission

have any statistics on whether there are more "Subject To"
opinions given for small registrants as opposed to large,

or however you want to define small and large, Clarence?
MR. HODGES:

Well, we get some statistics

out of Compustat, and I will tell you the numbers we have

include a few things that maybe they shouldn’t, but I think
the numbers are maybe about ten percent, whereas, I think
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you have something like six percent here and what, 60 0

companies?

I think there are a few things.
Ten percent may be slightly high.

Overall

of a population of about 9,000 companies it’s ten percent.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

Any higher correlation

for smaller companies?

MR. HODGES:

This includes 9,000, and

obviously if you get above 600 you get a lot of small
companies in it, so it must indicate a heavier number

on the smaller companies.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I see what you mean.

Anyone else want to address this private —
MR. JONES: Before you leave the governmental

area I'd like to express to you the feelings of the
Financial Council.

Basically they handle problems of

"Subject To" opinions for lost contingencies.
They feel that the guidance provided under

FAS Statement Number 5 and Statement Number 4, which was
recently adopted, which provided for guidance for applying,

whereas FAS Statement Number 5 is to government entities,

provide enough guidance for the fair presentation of
financial statements on governmental entities.
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They did have some problems with doing
away with emphasis on the matter paragraph, and if there

is a problem which may be somewhat unique to government
interests in those circumstances whereby an entity or a

governmental entity may not have sufficient funding to meet

the requirements of a bond issue.
The accounting principles currently do not

provide guidance for disclosure of that occurrence, and
for that reason they're somewhat reluctant to do away with

it.
They feel now that governments or the audits

of governmental entities are using that paragraph or that

mechanism to disclose circumstances where they feel that a
governmental entity, and particularly New York is the

example that they use, is not going to be able to or
possibly — and I'm not going to say without a doubt —

but possibly could not meet their bond requirements.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Reserve

requirements

or cash?
MR. JONES:

Well, cash requirements for

bonds.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: All right, Clarence,
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you’ve had some objections to the conclusion to eliminate
the emphasis of the matter paragraph I think also.

MR. SAMPSON: Well, that's true, but
you start without

objections to doing away with "Subject

To."

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I thought you were

convinced that was all right.

MR. SAMPSON: Oh, you did?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

It seemed obvious to

me.

MR. SAMPSON:

No, you have not convinced me

that I should rush home and write a note asking to do away
with the provision "Subject To."

If you did reach a conclusion that you
should do away with "Subject To" — and I personally don't

think the record today leads you to that conclusion — I
would still have some trouble if the Board was to undertake

to tell auditors under no circumstances that they were to
render a clean opinion for an "Except For" and nothing
in between.

If an auditor felt the need to say something

else I don't see that the Board should try to prevent that.
MR. LANDSITTEL: There might be a fine line,
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but I don’t think it's intended that any emphasis of the
matter paragraph for any reason would be prohibitive, if

you attempt to say that it shouldn’t be used as a surrogate

for disclosure of an uncertainty that would have otherwise

been a "Subject To" audit opinion.
MR. SAMPSON: One of the things that was

referred to earlier today that I thought about a bit,
a situation where the attorneys and the company agreed

that they’re going to lose their litigation, they don’t

know what it’s going to cost them, and if they can

successfully assert a minimum, even though they have
provided anything, but it's a material amount, I have a

difficult time seeing how an accountant would be able to

give a clean opinion no matter what the disclosure was
if he knows this company’s financial statements do not
include a liability or a charge against income which was
certain to occur in their view.
I have very much of a very big problem
with a clean opinion in those circumstances.

MR. LANDSITTEL:

Apart from the emphasis

of the matter paragraph?
MR. SAMPSON:

I’m not challenging GAAP, but
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there needs to be some emphasis, whether it's an emphasis
paragraph or "Subject To" or call it what you will.

If I were an auditor I sure as heck would

call people's attention to that.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

You understand our

not really argument but our decision at least on that, so
that if you have eliminated the qualification you don't

want some other manifestation of the same requirements —
MR. SAMPSON: I understand it entirely.
MR. BAILEY: Clarence, why wouldn't footnote
disclosure be sufficient?

MR. SAMPSON:

Because you' re expected to

call their attention to something that's such an important
thing

in

looking at this company.

MR. BAILEY:

Is it a reasonable expectation?

Perhaps we ought to change their expectations.

MR. SAMPSON:

I don't think anything today

has indicated that you are in the process of changing them.
It may be over a period of time.
MR. BAILEY:

It may be chickens and eggs.

If they don't make the suggestion

they may never be —

MR. SAMPSON: What's the

cost of continuing
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the "Subject To”? The only real cost that I’ve heard

expressed is the potential misuse of it.

And I’ve seen some of it and some misuse of,

perhaps today, but not sufficiently strong that it leads me
to conclude that it’s a major cost and not to be given
any great weight in looking at the question.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: I think there are a

couple of potential costs that we have not discussed

today because we weren’t intending to go through everything

in the issues paper, but we never did address the
implication that some people believe that you've emphasized

this matter by qualifying your opinion, therefore prioriti

zing the footnotes, saying, "Don't forget to read this one.
Is that an implication that everything else that is in

170 footnotes is of less importance, including perhaps the

very significant disclosures of discontinued operations
and some other things that don't have anything about
contingencies?
That's one cost perhaps of keeping it,
that it draws attention to things that might not necessarily
be more significant,whatever significant means, but the
literature happens to require you to draw

attention to

that particular type of item, and that the other is the
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implication that absent the "Subject To" opinion is it
significant — or rather is it true that no significant
uncertainties exist, and I think that’s a very real
possibility today, that people could believe that, and
that to me is a very — that's a distinct type of cost

because it's not true.
MR. SAMPSON:

I guess what I thought I heard

more clearly was we've got this one red flag in place, and

just because it's imperfect doesn't mean we don't like to
have it, we think it's useful, and please don't take it
away from us because you don't know how to deal with

other kinds of red flag that also might be important.

MR.KNOWLES:

I would think, Clarence, that

there is a very real cost beyond that, and none of us have
the statistics, but they could I guess be gathered.
is a cost of manpower.

There

How much does it take of your

manpower to persuade the bankers or underwriters to take
your issue forward to the public if you've got a
qualification on it? Presently in Canada what's looked on

as a form of qualified opinion rather than a comment
directed to the particular note is what obtains, and what
I heard people say today is that they rely heavily on the
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"Subject To" qualification on the premise that it
prioritizes the importance of the notes, and I thought I

heard the other side of the table say that’s an incorrect

premise.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, it is an incorrect
premise, to be sure.

In certain environments no one is

assessing what is more important to disclose or less
important, really.

MR. FAULS:

Why would a "Subject To" ever

be used?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Because the literature

requires you to for uncertainties.

It doesn’t require

you to at the moment, inappropriately, so in our belief

it’s a holdover from when disclosure requirements were
different than they are today, but that doesn’t mean
that in all of the items disclosed in these financial

statements the auditors conclude that’s the most important

thing to point out to someone.
MR. FAULS:

But might it be of a different

character than the other footnote?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

uncertainty.

It is.

It concerns
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MR. WATTERSTON:

And it's a potential

material adjustment to the financial statement.
Of course I said that probably too many

times. Of course I said that too many times, and I guess
I understand, you know, where you're coming from, and I

could probably argue from the other side, but I still —
you know, you've got significant opposition to this change,

and I'd just like to add to the literature or the statistical

surveys that were referred to before.
I took a survey this past week at my bank.

Fifty-one loan officers and credit analysts responded.
Forty-three were against eliminating this "Subject To,"

eight were for it.
The 43 that were against, you know, all the

same sort of answers you've heard today:

It encourages

greater auditors' care, it encourages greater user care,
it helps the unsophisticated investor, that the auditor
is the closest and the most impartial viewer, and we
expect this from him, and the material adjustment should be
noted.
Now, the people that are for the

elimination — and this is interesting — one says that it
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believes that it would encourage more disclosure but the
seven others think that it favors the sophisticated
investor, and one of my people said, "I favor anything
that makes the lender's job more difficult."

It favors the lender because it means that
other people can't do the lender's job, and if you want to

just say that the most sophisticated people, then you can

eliminate this thing.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, I won't even

talk to you about the sophistication of your sample or
anything else.

You've drawn very sweeping conclusions

from that, but I guess —

MR. WATTERSTON:

Well, you can't draw

sweeping conclusions, but one conclusion I come to is
that there is tremendous opposition to this.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
examine why.

But Jim, let's

I think we have to come to that.

And it is

perhaps the very issue that we've been discussing, but

doesn't it strike you as a little troublesome that the

user group tell us this has use and utility and we use
it, though I agree I believe with Mr. Knowles they have
not articulated at all how they use it other than as an
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indicator that they should be more diligent, that they
should be more diligent in their work, but when you get
through with your assumptions about how it's useful and
what you think it does — and I would certainly

go through

the 40 that you said voted against elimination there — by
and large the absolute opposite conclusion to what the

users are drawing is what the auditors are drawing, and
they are the ones that in fact, probably at least, know
the circumstances under which they're giving this opinion.

So that it really fundamentally bothers me

that you believe that you're getting something that we're
in fact not delivering, don't intend to deliver, probably

don't believe we can deliver, and yet even though you
aren't getting what you think you are, you still think it's
useful.
And I really — that to me becomes the

bottom line.
Clarence says that we have not certainly

built a track record that you don't think it's useful, and
I agree with that, you all believe it is.

You've built a

pretty good track record to me and my concerns are legitimate.
You only believe it is, but you should not
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believe it is, not for the reasons you've indicated, so
we feel really I think it comes back to almost the same

capacity, but it concerns me that the users aren't concerned,

they say "I still want this even though it isn't at all
what I think it is from what you're telling me," and that's
what we've done for four hours.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

Has anybody done an

analysis of the statistical tables in "Subject To" to
analyze what was the nature of the uncertainty to which
"Subject To" was referenced since FAS 5 went into effect,
post-FAS 5 "Subject To"?

I think if that hadn't been done that

would be something which I would be very much interested
in. That would tend to tell you when and why auditors
might be calling attention to —

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

It's litigation.

MR. MULLARKEY:

More than the general

MR. PREWOZNIK:

It's not all litigation,

category?

though.

In other words, there are lines being drawn, are

there not?
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

MR. PREWOZNIK:

Yes.

You don’t have "Subject To’s”

referring to every bit of litigation.
So the question is —
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

MR. PREWOZNIK:

draw the flies?

No, no.

— What kinds of litigation

To me that's interesting because it at

least gives you some idea of what the profession has been
doing since FAS 5 went into effect and gives you some

idea of what they're thinking about when they're doing it.
In other words, a case could be made that
as soon as FAS 5 came into effect some kind of switch,

some criteria came into play and are being applied, however
informally, but this kind of a survey it seems to me

would reveal how these choices are being made by what is
referred to by "Subject To" and what isn't.
Because all things are not being referred to.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Well, I think we
all have some presumption that it’s litigation, and it

also happens to be the kind of litigation where the
ability to predict the amount of liability, if any, is
admittedly extremely difficult but known to be large.
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Now, that tends to be —
MR. HODGES:
known to be large?

Doesn’t it go beyond just

Somebody mentioned Robbins here today,

which is a small company, probably got a good earnings

record, if you believe the income statements as they
stand, but if they have to pick up the tab for some of
the suits that are pending against them now it could be
absolutely devastating.

And therefore those statements

are absolutely irrelevant.
On the other hand their insurance company

may pick up enough of the tab that this doesn't hurt

at all.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

Do the disclosures in the

footnotes articulate that problem?

MR. HODGES:

Okay, these people tell us

that —
A SPEAKER:

Yes, they do.

MR. HODGES: These people tell us it's

something of unusual pervasiveness, not just because it's

big but the snowball effects that go with this material.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

I also wanted to mention

on Clarence's point there that even if it's concluded that
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a negative outcome is probable you can have a case where
the estimated loss barely meets the minimum threshhold of

materiality.

Do you follow me?

It’s a sure loser, but we're going to beat
the hell out of them on the damages.

I don't see why

that would have to be flagged by a "Subject To."
So I'm simply pointing out, Clarence, that
all probable litigation doesn't necessarily rise to the
level of having to go to "Subject To" because there is a

second switch to check.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Did anyone react to

my characterization of what we've done today in terms of
discussion that we've discussed the issue we were asked to

discuss but by and large ended up with a difference in
perception as to whether the people that see this as
having utility are entitled to that perception?

Am I

wrong in believing that, do you think, or am I the only
one that thinks that?
MR. PREWOZNIK:

I think that — my — I

think we're on the same frequency, that the perception
is based obviously in good faith on a misunderstanding

of what the literature presently says about when the
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"Subject To" comes into play.
And the problem is the literature should
not be calling for a "Subject To."

That's the real problem. It's just an

anachronism.
MR. BAILEY:

I would agree, and more than that,

there is no reason for them to change their perception

here because there is not cost to them. The way they use

the information is to soreen and alter their research
process and then give advice for a decision with respect

to lending and financing.
The errors they would make with those

signals would keep them from doing something, and they

would do something else, and they'll never get an assessment
of what might have been if they had taken a different

approach. There is no cost in their decision-making
process.

The cost lies elsewhere with the person who

makes the decision subject to or the auditor who renders
it, and so they have no reason to change their opinions

either, these groups.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: We accept them as

representative of user groups, too.
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MR. BAILEY:

These user groups have no

reason to change their decision, so I don’t think you can
argue them out of it.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

That seems to be

a conclusion I can agree with.

MR. CARMICHAEL:

Well, we didn't come here

to argue, we came to gather information.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

MR. WYCISKALA:

Paul.

I think one of the points

here is that we have a communication problem, a lack of
understanding on the part of the auditors of what the

users want and the users what the auditors are saying.
But I think one thing we can overcome —
you know, in the discussions today we unfortunately won't
be able to bring Mr. average investor in, but I don't like

to see the uses,1

and the reasons for uses dismissed out of

hand because unfortunately we didn't set any ground rules

nor have we ever published why or how the user should use

it, so I think it's adequate to say that there are users.

Okay, traditionally we have required that
a copy of the auditor’s report be included in the annual
reports. Over time the security industry analysts and
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others have set about on a task trying to educate the
readers to use such things as the auditors' reports.
We've had auditors' reports used for a long
period of time for a diversity of purposes, but nevertheless

we have brought the public, even though they may be not
using it exactly the way we would like it, but they have
been finding it useful.

So far the discussions have also basically
dwelt solely on litigation. Litigation is only one of many
uncertainties, and we haven't really broken open the

iceberg yet on the question of uncertainties in severs1

areas that lead to a question about the company's ability
to continue as a going concern, and I think that if the

action that is proposed here today is moved forward we're

going to find a situation where less is going to be more,

eliminating the emphasis paragraph and the "Subject To"
is less but the more it is going to create is more disclosure
that is going to be understood by fewer people.
We may have a more litigious environment,

and I am just concerned that the less is going to turn out

to be more, especially when we come to going concern
situations.
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MR. LANDSITTEL:

How do you conclude it

would be a more litigious environment?

MR. WYCISKALA: To make the quantum jump
and say, "From here on out as long as there is adequate

disclosure there is nothing" I think is going to be such

a shock wave to the people that need and use and rely on

it now that, you know, possibly the actions may not be
to anything, but I think it’s going to bring in question
whether stepping aside from what has traditionally been
done and a rule that is perceived to have served the .

public interest is a stepping away and abrogation of. the
professional responsibility.
I think that's where the issue is going

to come out.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

It is a very interesting

observation to have focused on litigation. What are

the differences in the pros and cons for a going concern

issue vis-a-vis the litigation issue in your mind?

I mean

would the same pros and cons carry over or are there

different issues that should be pretty sharply identified?
MR. WYCISKALA:

In my opinion the question

of the going concern, since it goes to the whole heart of
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what the financial statements present and the whole basis

of GAAP, I think that is such a pervasive issue that at
least it would have to be separated from removing the

"Subject To" or other matters.
Maybe there should be some definition on

the situations in which a "Subject To" should be given.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Well, I'd like to

hear more people discuss that just so that we all understand
we have not made a distinction in the proposal between

"Subject To" opinions with respect to continued existence,

which you consider to be a realization, asset realization
on classification of liabilities issue and other forms of

contingencies at all.

They've all been considered the same.

I think the principal reason for that is

the inability to separate litigation from the going concern
issue as long as what's being litigated is a big enough
number.

MR. WYCISKALA:

Well, that's part of my

concern, because again, disclosure in Footnote 2 of

possible, you know, technical defaults where the company
is continuing on waivers, a situation in Footnote Number 5
that may address litigation, and another section on
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contingencies, maybe some regulatory actions have been
brought, each one of them standing alone being read

separately may not necessarily all be bridged to give
appropriate highlights that, you know, when you put them
all together you’ve got a question of the going concern,
and that is the basis that I think the "Subject To"

opinion, especially where going concern matters are

involved, has been served extremely well by the "Subject To"
opinions.

MR. GREENE:

Let me just elaborate on that,

because some of the things "Subject To" does, it does give
emphasis. And people say, "Well, you shouldn't do that,
once it goes to the totality of the financial statement."
But there is another pervasive policy in the law saying it

may not be enough just to put the facts here and there,

it's not enough to point to the facts and say, "They're

all there if you look for them," there are some facts you
have to emphasize and put them all there for the reader,
and I think it exists not so much in the accounting as the

disclosure area.
There is a strong sense that others looking
at it say that "Well, maybe you understood it by putting
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it all together, but it should have been presented all
differently," but perhaps emphasis is not a bad value with
respect to some users.

Maybe from your point you’re emphasizing

the wrong things, but that may suggest opening up more

ways of emphasizing rather than saying,"We’re emphasizing
nothing," and turning back to the footnotes.
If you read these footnotes, they don’t
give you the sense of what’s going on as much as disclosure

in other forms.

You’re asking that to bear a lot of

judgment that Other ways of presenting information are

perhaps more helpful.
MR. MULLARKEY: That’s a very serious
statement, isn't it, that the footnotes do not present

information people need.
MR. GREENE: I'm just saying there are

various values, and people struggle with what's the best

way to present it and how does it come through, and so

forth.

I don't think there is any agreement about how

you communicate to various users your presentation. Indeed
we are struggling with that in a variety of ways, but

there are some cases where it may not simply be enough to
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rely on disclosure; in fact I would suspect that in some
context people would not rely totally on that but would

want to emphasize it in different ways.

MR. WYCISKALA:

In terms of the shareholders,

not the users of the annual report, something like 10K,
you know, I think the real problem is earlier on one of
the premises we were looking at the knowledgeable user

of the financial statement; well, after about 24 years
various dealings with accountants' reports and so forth I
find that day by

day I am finding it more difficult to

read the footnotes, so I think that possibly the next step

we’re talking about is further reducing those that would be
able to understand and make use of the financial statements

in their totality without — call it expanded disclosure,
I don't like to call it applied, expanded disclosure that

we presently have.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

My view and that of a

number of partners in my firm, we can understand the

benefit of an emphasis, but again, it gets into what
the proper auditor really is doing, and it's very hard
to determine where you — or you get very uneasy with
the determination that the auditor is smart enough to
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know what should be emphasized and what shouldn't be
emphasized, and you can say "Well, pervasiveness is a key
and going concern is the most pervasive," but even so we
get into situations under the present framework where I

can see a client's frustration when they come to us and

they say,"Well, why are you giving a 'Subject To' opinion,
are the measurement standards applied wrong?"
"No. "

"Are the disclosure standards wrong?"

"We'll disclose whatever you want us to
disclose."
"Fine.

Are the statements going to change?"

"No, these particular statements won't
later change."

"Then what makes you, auditor, so smart
that you then have to go on and apply some other criteria

to suggest that you read the future in a way, re going
concern or whatever the uncertainty, in a way that you

have to assume an additional responsibility that we can't
meet because it's impossible for us to meet them in terms

of the financial statements?"
And I think that's a very frustrating
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problem with the concept of the emphasis, whether it's in
a paragraph or a qualified opinion. That makes me uneasy
in terms of the auditor role that I think Henry this

morning articulated.
MR. KNOWLES:

I’d like to pick up on that

on Edward’s point. It seems to me that if you take the
point that you just made, on your point, you’re trying to

make a

five-legged elephant. The financial statements

are prepared by management and are reported upon by the

auditor in terms of whether they comply with GAAP or don't

comply with it.

Now you're asking them to do two things:

You're asking them to emphasize or do a mini-analysis of

what the statements mean, which is the duty of the
financial analyst or other person who analyzes the

statement, and you're also asking them to put a qualitative
judgment on the financial position of the corporation, and
I don't think the auditor is either trained or qualified to

do that.

He can put the standard judgment on the
financial statements that they've met the standards, but

then when you switch across to either disclosure from
the prospectus frame of reference or to quantitative or
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qualitative analysis, you must go to the analyst or the

other person whose business that is, and if you’re thinking
of disclosure in the context of a prospectus, stop and
think who is liable in a prospectus, and that’s all the
people who have touched the thing along the way, and if
you impose that type of duty on the accounting profession

then they’re going to become liable for non-disclosure in

their audit opinion themselves, which opens up a whole
new cost factor because their fees will go up and insurance
premiums will go up, so they won’t get to reap the benefits

of the increased fees. But I think this is too much across
the lines to try and construct the one perfect thing with
one body.

MR. GREENE:

I start from a totally different

premise. We have a system now where basically we have an

audit report which has a "Subject To."
The argument is made because of the change

in accounting standards, because of contingency there is

no need to have a report that grew up before the standards
were there, and that the standards being sound, therefore

the report should change, and I think — from our
perspective I don't think the case has been carried.

And to the extent that users and others find
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this emphasis useful, why should they be told, "Well, tough,

you’re using it the wrong way because of the change in the

auditing standards."
And that’s the fundamental argument. I
think you’re exactly right, the standards have now changed.

Now we can have an auditing report commensurate with the
new standards. And that's I think a very — that's a judgment

call, and it's a very close question.
I mean we in a sense inherited the system,
and now we're going totally to take a change from it

because of your perception that we don't understand what
you're about to be doing.

MR. MULLARKEY:

That's not quite right.

You didn't inherit the system as much as the system existed,
and then the standards caught up with it.

MR. GREENE:

That's fair.

MR. MULLARKEY: And now it's no longer

necessary but it's being retained by people who don't

understand it, and they're going to use it, and the lack of
burden as to whether they're going to use it means whether
they understand what they're using. It's every difficult

to use something effectively if you don't understand what
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it is that you're using.
It also focuses attention on one area at

the expense of another.

Putting some of these comments,

what has been said, that if we eliminate

the "Subject To"

more information would go in the footnotes, I think that's

what Ed said. And that was less information for the investor
to read.
I mean if we have a fundamental problem —■

and we're all in the public interest here — if the fundamen
tal problem is that financial statements can't be understood,

then the retention of the auditor's subjective opinion is
not the answer as much as the distraction over the issue,

whatever the issue is, and we've got this holdover of the
people who are investing, meaning to invest, as different

from the people who are issuing them, and they are dazzling
themselves, so the cost is to leave something out which
could be misleading in the way people use it because they
use it differently than the way it's developed and ignore

the problem.
MR. GREENE:

I wish the group hadn't left

here, but I don't think they — You suggested they
emphasize that and the other information not seen in this
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report.

I think they say they begin to look at a company,

they look at everything.

I don’t think they say they look

at the footnotes, to the "Subject To" and treat it at a
higher level.
I think they’re saying they use it in a

way of generating a fact about a company, some of which is

general —
MR. MULLARKEY:

But in the mosaic one thing

they developed was looking at it today and tomorrow. And
they're sophisticated users of financial statements, and

when we talk about the public interest it includes all
users.

I don't think we can expect all users to be as

knowledgeable about all these differences, and this only

focuses on one narrow area when the auditors' role is to make
sure that the information is useable rather than to interpret

one piece of the information when the users aren't inter

preting the way we are.

I think it's a very serious issue, and it's
not an issue of taking away something that legitimately is
not disclosed in the footnotes, because if that is so then

we should change whatever the standards are that require

management to disclose items.
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It is this shadow role that's misunderstood

either by the people who issue these or by the people who

use them, because there is a difference, and I don't think

we can just because it exists then therefore say it is no
cost or it’s not wrong if we can’t figure out why it has
utility.

MR. BAILEY: Suppose you take the approach of

"We don't have it."

Some of us wouldn't agree, by the way,

that just because you had it it's logically appropriate to

retain it, but suppose you did not have it. There seems to
me to be a fundamental difference between the other
opinions and this one. This one seems to cross the line,

referring back to a set of standards into an analysis point
of view, which was not expressed.
The question then is is that an appropriate

auditor's role?

Clarence at that point made a statement

that had some meaning to me that he may not have intended,

he said just because at the moment we have this one red

flag, which may not be perfect but please don't take it
away from us, am I to take it that that means maybe we should
have two red flags or three red flags, and there is a
subtle sort of shading there that really worries me, because
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we retain this and it’s only the first of a whole series of

red flags auditors are moving from, sort of, the auditing

function as we've generally treated it, into an analysis
and reporting assessment function which I think they've

never said they wanted, a claim they don't have, a claim

they aren't providing, and yet I think of well, more than

half of the scenarios over here suggest that they believe
the analysts believe they are providing that function.

MR. SAMPSON:

I was merely repeating what

I thought I heard the users say, and not leading towards
anything, but I think you overstate the case as well when

you say auditors have no analysis role at all, because in

reading evaluations about fair presentation, they're always

looking into the future in some respects, and they have a
lot of that kind of thing which goes into an audit statement
and financial considerations.

MR. MULLARKEY:

But that's a role subsumed

by GAAP as opposed to a separate role not subsumed by GAAP.

MR. KNOWLES:

In Canada,

anyway, they don't

assume it's a fair presentation and they don't say it's
a fair presentation, they say it's a fair presentation in
accordance with GAAP.

157

And in Canada you can't separate those

statements or stop halfway through.
MR. SAMPSON:

Nor can you here.

MR. KNOWLES:

To me that's a difference of

significance, though, when you're making a point.

Fair

presentation, that's the job of the analyst to decide after
if it’s a fair presentation in accordance with GAAP.

It's also a fair presentation to make to
the buyer to recommend a buy or sell.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I think there is some

danger that the people sitting around this table have both

the inclination and the patience to discuss this topic in

perpetuity, and we at the Auditing Standards Board certainly

have evidenced that ability at least, so I would guess that

this group isn't much different.
It just happens that the views are perhaps
more divided here, but I think we might miss a significant

opportunity to input the session if we didn't recognize that
we have some people in our audience who are observers that

have observed this discussion from the beginning, particularly
meaning the AICPA staff, some of the other observers that
are here from public accounting firms that traditionally
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observe all of our meetings, and that doesn't preclude any
of you.
The Advisory Council people are here, and
I guess I'd like to ask if any of you back there have any
specific observations, comments or anything that you'd like

to ask any of us or ask us to discuss, perhaps, because,
as I said, I think you’ve witnessed this for a long time and
may have some perceptions that are missing us.

So I'd like to throw it open to the floor

for everyone to have the floor and ask in some orderly
fashion here for comments.
Anybody?

Marty?

A SPEAKER:

I had one question that

I wanted

to ask the bankers, and that is, do they perceive of any

loss of information value when they have to review a set

of financial statements that carry a review report by a

CPA, not an audit report?
The standard of our profession's review
of financial statements does not call for an uncertainty
qualification, so I wanted an assessment of the differences

between the set of audit statements and the review report
statements in that regard.
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MR. GRIMMIG:

Right or wrong, I think the

perception — perhaps it's a personal perception — is

that there has been a continuous step back by the accounting

profession from what used to be the unqualified audit

as the be all and end all of the world that bankers wanted
and relied on.

Then we got sold on this review and
compilation, which informed us two or three or four steps

backward, in my opinion, and now we heard this, which I

consider a massive step backwards.
We had the question of reasonableness, which
appeared to me to be a major step backwards, which was

involved or at least is still in the opinion.

To my way of thinking 14,000 banks are
literally here asking you to keep this thing in your

opinion letters, and we are literally begging you to do it

because we're telling you it’s helpful, and all I hear is "You

mean you

think it's helpful, Mr. Banker, we don't think

it's helpful to you, so we’re going to take it out."
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: That isn't exactly

it.

I think we were far more critical than that.
MR. WATTERSTON:

I would say that we don’t
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obviously consider reviews as we would an audit.

We don’t

think that the standards associated with review come anywhere

near the standards associated with audit, and it would
obviously, no matter what the disclosures are, call for a

whole lot more work by the banker than if he had gotten an
opinion, unqualified opinion on an audited report.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Joe, you have observed

this fiasco for the whole year.

A SPEAKER:

The thing I find enormously

troublesome is the flip side of the perception with

respect

to the presence of the "Subject To," and that is to say the

negative inference that if there is not a "Subject To" then
there is some type of qualitative affirmation being provided
by the independent auditor that is giving assurance and
comfort to the users.
In terms of the public policy considerations

and in terms of the public interest I'm deeply troubled

that the financial community and nearly all of the constituen

cies, maybe including the accounting profession — and I’m
sure the legal profession is totally confused on the point —
really do not have the focus and grasp on what is really a

limited tool, if we were to accept it as an analysis tool.
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There are many other elements of uncertainty
that are just not addressed by the "Subject To" that

are not signaled, that do not have the benefit of the

so-called red flag.

And if we accept it as a prioritization

factor it’s dealing with a shallow universe, and if we

don’t change it, it seems to me that at a minimum the
private sector and the public sector really must undertake
a widespread assignment in terms of education, self-education

so that we close the gap as to just what this wonderful

animal is and what purpose it serves, and what measure in

fact is the reasonable element of reliance.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

J.T. Ball, do you have

any observations or questions or comments —

MR. J.T. BALL:

I’ll pass.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: — that you'd like to
make?
Yes, sir?
MR. PREWOZNIK:

Along the lines that Joe

mentioned, to me there is a very basic issue of fairness or

unfairness, if you will, to companies and to the auditors,
who I think now find themselves in the position -- if I were

an auditor I would have to tell you that on the basis of
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what I see in your literature here I can't tell you when
I am sure that I know when I should go "Subject To" and
when I shouldn't.
To me that's intolerable, that's unfair to

me as a professional, because it puts me at great peril in
terms of my responsibility to the public and to my company
plans in terms of how I make my judgments, and it looks to

me in some cases as though it's kind of a crap shoot.

It's unfair to those companies because in
my experience companies don't like to receive "Subject To,"
and when you come up with this amorphous body of criteria,

why if we can call it that, say, "Well, we made up our

minds on the basis of this," I don't see that it's fair.
And if it's not fair you're going to have the case — forgive

me if I don't know about it — but you're going to have the
case where the bankers are going to be going through the
process of having the young Harvard business grads going
through the flags, and one that should have had a flag

attached to it doesn't have it, and so there is a lawsuit,
and the question is what are the criteria there as to whether

that should have been flagged or not.
These pieces of literature don’t establish
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the criteria.

Maybe the survey we talked about would

give some idea, but you're going to have a Judge do it,
and to me that’s not fair, that’s not good business.

And the outcome needs to be that you either

eliminate this unfair situation, you recognize the fact
that it is unfair and guide it by your own light and your

reliance on Stanford and GAAP, you adopt a different mode
that is not unfair to these auditors and to these companies

or I think you force these auditors into a corner where they
say, "Well, we’re going to have to develop some criteria,

we can't sit here and wait for some Judge to tell us
whether we should or should not have gone here on some

particular uncertainty.”

And then I think when they do that they're

going to say, "We're dealing with some accounting principles
here, we're trying to put in order the magnitude of uncer

tainties,” and to me that's a self-revealing truth.
The problem, if there is one, I don't believe

there is — is that somebody seeks an ordination of uncer

tainties, and to me that's an accounting problem, it's not
an auditing problem and I don't know whether you can get
much beyond that except to say,

"Well, if you don't face that
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confrontation between the pure accounting issue and the
auditing issue," then I would say that if I were advising
the auditor I would say, "Modify your FAS 2 to say that,"

as I discussed with Clarence at lunch, "We’ll amend it.
We’ll retain it but we're going to amend it and we're going
to amend it based on a

fortiori conclusion that the FAS 5

has told us that everything that's in these financials

with respect to uncertainty is material, and so we're going
to amend FAS 2, which says on its face that we're only

supposed to deal with material elements; whenever there is
an uncertainty referred to in a financial statement or in

footnotes we'll go 'Subject To' by simply saying 'Subject
to the uncertainties that are discussed in this financial

statement.'"
MR. CARMICHAEL:

Which virtually means every

major company will have "Subject To" opinions.
MR. PREWOZNIK:

Practically every company.

In fact, that's how you bring this thing
to a fair resolution.

That's what I would see in sum here

as the bottom line of this whole picture.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Staff, Standards Board

Staff, almost all of you are here and you've had to listen
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to this for a long time; do you have any points you think
we should have asked and didn’t?

Can I ask any of the bankers one short

question prompted by Jerry's remarks:

Given retention,

which I'm not willing to admit personally, but given that
you retain "Subject To," and having been told that

there is a criterion for when that opinion is expressed,

that's at best a little ambiguous and loose, what would
you find as an acceptable criterion for when we would
and wouldn’t give a "Subject To" opinion, or haven't you

thought about that?

It may not be very fair.

MR. WATTERSTON:

It's probably not a fair

question.
What Jerry said doesn't necessarily in my

mind at least lead you to dropping the "Subject To."
One alternative is to define it a little

tighter or get the FASB to change the standards so you're
not so uncomfortable when you have to make that judgment.

So I think those are your alternatives.

I'd sure be willing to look at a proposal

that would put some greater definition on when you use
the "Subject To."
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MR. KINNEY:

If you had Jerry’s alternative

and every time the FAS 5 required footnotes that are

subject to opinion, it's completely redundant with what
the FAS 5 required, and you say I don't need that because
the footnotes have it, and it's just telling you the same

thing already there, which is the extreme case —

MR. WATTERSTON:Well, that was the extreme
case, that's right, where everybody gets a "Subject To."

MR. PREWOZNIK:

Well, it's somewhat of a

middle ground in the sense that if you're looking for flags,

let's not use a six by six flag, let's use an 18 by 18 flag
which picks

up all the uncertainty, so we're going to go

through 40 percent more, so the people who are looking
for the flags, you're going to find all the reports that

have uncertainties in the footnotes.

Maybe that's all you

want.

MR. LANDSITTEL:

But not all major concerns

will have uncertainties in the footnotes.

It will be our

standard language.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

I didn't mean to say that.

You would refer to uncertainties only if there were uncer
tainties mentioned in the footnotes.
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Oh, what you’re saying is all the companies?
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Right, any major

company essentially has some contingencies, we've acknowledged

that.

MR. PREWOZNIK:

So it certainly demonstrates

the unfairness of the present situation.
On what basis are these people picking and

choosing among those uncertainties?
MR. WATTERSTON:

But their solution is to

drop it completely rather than —

MR. MULLARKEY:

I think our solution is

that we want to adequately describe such disclosures and
eliminate what preceded those standards.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: Except that's what

bothers me.
MR. MULLARKEY:

If they aren't adequate the

"Subject To" opinion isn't doing it.

MR. WATTERSTON:

You know I think Ed talked

about, you know, you look at each of the pieces and, well,
each one may be a little shaky and there may be some

uncertainty about each one, but as a whole it raises a
question maybe as to the going

concern here.

I think
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one of the things we're paying auditors for is to give

some sort of judgment on the whole statement.
I don't think we want to see them back away

from that.

MR. FAULS:

Of course if that's true the

very components of the aggregate cast doubt on the going

concern and you can't have statements because they're
misleading if they are not pulled into a going concern

articulation.
They just don't fairly present under the
current GAAP requirement.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

If continued existence

was known to not be possible I suspect you'd go that route.
MR. FAULS:

For a judgmental, and the

auditor's judgment may not be saying it's the client. If

it isn't he'd better say so.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:
A SPEAKER:

Joe?

There was some discussion about

the possible increased legal exposure of the accountant to
the auditor for not emphasizing an opinion.

The Accountants

Services Committee apparently considered FASB 5 in the
development of FAS 1, and they allowed accountants who
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issued compilation reports not to modify their reports as

long as the inconsistencies or uncertainties, is the
language, and uncertainties is the language which you are

concerned with, are appropriately disclosed in notes

to the financial statements.
I'm wondering, since we have some legal
expertise here, whether the absence of the modification of

the emphasis in a review report has ever caused problems for

an accountant who did not emphasize a matter that was

appropriately disclosed in the footnotes about an uncertainty
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: We don't know the answer
to that.

We've considered it and asked legal counsel, and

the fact is that we don't have an answer to that question,
one of the reasons being that the more researchable case

law obviously involves public companies, and we're rarely
the recipients of either compilation or review reports,

so it's very difficult — I mean you could speculate, surely,
that yes, that could occur, and you might be right, but I
think it's unfair to ask legal counsel to just do that
because we've asked it and we don't know the answer.

MR. MULLARKEY: Right, it's being researched.
MR. KNOWLES:

I'd like to come back to James
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Watterston.

He ended up by saying, "What are we paying

the accountant for," and he was talking about perhaps the

aggregate

of the points leading up to the going concern

question.
I think the answer is we aren't paying the

accounting profession.

In the particular issue we're

paying the auditors in the circumstances and the bank or the
analyst receives its reward in terms of the term that it make
on its loan or commissions on the sales of securities, so

I think that again that starts to blend the roles as to who

is doing what to whom for what purposes, and it's not the
auditor's job to present such a financial statement that it

can just be rubber-stamped and the bankers or the investment

community can make their interest return or other revenues

on the basis of the auditor's report.
MR. WATTERSTON:

I don't mean to imply that

we don't just take what we get here and make a decision.

Obviously a lot of analysis and judgment goes into it, but

it seems to me when an auditor gets all done doing all his
work he better stand back and take a look at all the

statements as a whole, see whether they make sense.
MR.MULLARKEY:

Yes, and I think auditors do
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that for more than uncertainties, they do it for the whole

financial presentation.
MR. WATTERSTON:

I want them to do it for

the whole thing, not just the uncertainties.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

And by definition I

know they aren’t going to be adjusted by the problem you’re
worrying about.

MR. WATTERSTON:

They may not be adjusted

but they could be.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

No, they can't be.

They never will be.

MR. WATTERSTON:

They can't be, but I want to

know whether I should in my analysis adjust.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

The problem I have

with that, Jim, is you want me to make that evaluation.

MR. WATTERSTON:

I don't want you to tell me

how much to adjust it by, I just want you to tell me that
maybe I ought to think about adjusting them.
A SPEAKER:

I'm a member of an ABA committee

and I don't mean to be redundant in terms of comment but I

have been sitting here all day listening to the discussion,
and it seems very much to me that this last line is really
where we started out.
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The users — and it's really an educational
misperception problem, echoes back to issues that have been

going on for years between auditors and users of financial
statements.

What is the role of the auditor, what is
the function of the financial statements?

The users would like a degree of certainty
beyond that which financial statements present, are intended
to present or that the auditors suggest they present and

there is a perception that I get that the "Subject To" is
a way of at least in the users' minds conveying that little
wink or nod that "There is more here than meets the eye,"
and that's not the case.
The auditors deny that's the case, but the

users say, "In spite of the denial we still want it because

we don't believe you."
As a logical, rational matter it seems to

me that the place to start is to correct the perception of
the user as to what he is getting, and not to try to — I

use a

pejorative word — pervert the system to continue to

encourage the user to be misled, and I think that that's the
principal basis that I've heard that the users say that it’s
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useful, because they’re using it based on a misperception
of what they’ve been told, that they like to be told that,

so they want to continue.
It seems to me that GAAP requires the
financial statement to make adequate disclosure.

The

"Subject To" contingency adds nothing to the disclosure

quantitatively or qualitatively, and therefore it is
certainly in logic a redundancy.
I have very little in the way of deep
concern about the user who wishes not to use the financial

statements, not to read the financial statement, not to
understand the financial statement but would like to have

somebody, an auditor for the moment, tell him that there
is something he ought to pay attention to.
That’s really, it seems to me, the user's

responsibility, be it the banker or the analyst or the public
investor.

If he can't do it himself then he has to pay

somebody to do the job who will be able to understand what
he’s being told.
But I don't think that we really advance
the ball by continuing the misperception of what the

financial statements represent.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

In case there is a

shadow of doubt in anyone’s mind, the ABA referred to is

not the American Bankers Association, it's the American Bar

Association.
MR. SAMPSON: There was no doubt.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: All right, I wanted to

clear that up.
Meryl?
I'd like to ask the bankers to

MS. REED:

describe what they think it would take on the part of the
accounting and auditing profession in order for you to be

satisfied and agree on the elimination of the "Subject To"
opinion, and if you thought it was better disclosure, what
kind of disclosure, percentages or what, reorganization of
the footnotes or what?

What recommendations would you give

as the prerequisite for the elimination?

MR.WATTERSTON:

I never approached it from

that standpoint, I never thought there was a chance that

this thing would ever pass, so once it gets down the line
and looks like it's going to pass we'll come up with alter

natives .
MR. KINNEY:

We're only guessing as to what

175

that might be, because we say, "What would you like to see

highlighted?"

And there is no hint from anybody.

MR. WATTERSTON: Well, we like reasonably well

what you have.

Maybe you could be a little more specific

on guidelines when you use this thing, and so on.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Let's presume we aren't

going to use it at all. If we're going to eliminate "Subject

To," you've said this — I think most people have — implied

that the disclosure standards are inadequate for your needs
and I think Meryl is only asking in what manner are they

inadequate?
If that's right.

Maybe we're putting words

in your mouth.
MR. WATTERSTON: Maybe we should have this

meeting a month from now, when we can focus on that instead

of having us prepared for something different.
MR. J.T. BALL:

I think, Jim, that probably

raises the issue of the single contingency footnote, which

I think was also raised when Clarence wrote us and suggested
that we consider that, that Ag Sec consider the matter.
And we did examine the issue of the single
contingency footnote,

concluded that it would not help
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anything because in effect all of the footnotes are pointing

to various contingencies, so you either have one footnote
that's an index of all the other footnotes or else you have
a tremendous duplication, and as a matter of fact those

who have considered this matter very carefully have suggested
to us that the single contingency footnote is not a very good

idea, consequently the Board decided — the FASB decided
not to pursue further consideration of it.

I would guess what would be needed would

be for management to make the same kind of assessment the
auditor has to and put a going concern qualification in the
footnotes, but that's only a guess.

CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

You don't want to put

any probabilities on the willingness to do that?
MR. LANDSITTEL:

The argument against the

single contingency footnote in my mind runs very parallel

to some of the same arguments as apply — you can't have a
single kind of a contingency opinion.

You know, what

contingency are you talking about if you don't have that
footnote? Is there a flip side implication that there is an
unqualified lack of contingency?
There is some of the same frustration with

177

the judgment as to when you can set a standard to drive

the single contingency footnotes that I believe is the

judgment of the auditor's role as to when — and the lack.
of clarity of the standards of when you might have a "Subject

To" opinion.

MR. BALL:

But I would agree with Ed Green

that an auditor probably looks at a lot of different

contingencies in reaching a conclusion to call attention to
certain contingencies, and it may not be any one standing

alone, it may be the combination of them that causes that
qualification.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

Jack?

Yes, since the bankers group

A SPEAKER:

is the only user group, or practically the only one left,

you are the target.

Let me ask this:

Would you welcome

the Auditing Standards Board expanding standards to establish

flags for other topics to which your attention could be
directed?
MR. GRIMMIG:

SPEAKER:

I sure would.

What other topics might those be?

MR. GRIMMIG:

Well, maybe I’m not— I

don't pretend to be an accountant, I don't pretend to be
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much of a banker, but if there was some way to indicate
in the footnotes that the quality of the accounts receivable

were 85 percent collectible, versus 100 percent collectible,

if the inventory was 50 percent stale and 25 percent brand
new and salable, if there were some qualifications that
the figures and the numbers in the financial statement,
each item, were plus or minus two percent or 20 percent

valid on a conservative basis or on a liquidation basis,
this would be the range that would be damned helpful.

You said in the footnotes.

Now, would you

also be very happy to see auditors raise flags directing
your attention to such footnotes in the report itself?

In the auditor’s report itself?

MR. GRIMMIG:

In the letter, sure.

So all matter of subjects, whether they be

these you just mentioned, whether it’s unusual executive
compensation, unusual accounting treatments, I suppose a

long list, you'd be very happy to see flags?
MR. GRIMMIG:

It would be very helpful as

long as it gave me another red flag to look at.
MR. WATTERSTON:

Well, I guess I wouldn't

go that far, but I'd like the auditor to tell me where or
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which major adjustments are his in that statement, the

potential adjustments, and of course most of those relate
to what we're talking about today, litigation or going

concern realization or discontinued operations or something

like that.
MR. LANDSITTEL:

Well, what should we rely

upon as a framework for making that evaluation?

I mean we

rely upon GAAP and GAAP tells us that there aren't adjustments
to be made, and we would take an exception to our opinion.

We have that framework to do that, apart from the "Subject

To" opinion —
MR. WATTERSTON:

Well, you ought to go down

to the FASB and get them to change the standards.

MR. LANDSITTEL:

Well, you're implying a

deficiency in the standards, and I guess I don't understand
the specificity.

MR. WATTERSTON:

No, the standards stay,

you don't have to make the adjustment at the moment because
you don't have to exactly figure out what it might be.

But there is a potential, you know, of significant adjustment
I don't see the problem of bringing that to the user’s
attention.
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CHAIRMAN LEISENRING:

I think it’s a matter

in some of our concerns, Jim — it’s a matter of degrees,

perhaps, and we all can think of our given examples, but

when you say that it implies to us I believe a feeling on
your part that there is inherently more precision in the

financial statements apart from contingencies that we
just inherently know don’t exist, there are probably more
dollars of accounting estimate adjustments that went into

issues that are not highlighted, not even discussed, than
are potentially payable under the litigation in question,

and yet we’re not asking for that.

I think it’s a matter of — I think we’re

concerned that there is an implication of precision that
is presumed, and then we carve out this contingency issue
and make us sort of pseudo-lawyer predictors as to judgments

that in our own mind may not be as significant, although
material, nowhere near as significant as the statements

that went into the statements themselves.
MR. HODGES: it's an entirely fair estimate,

you know, that there are estimates in the life of an asset
and the recovery value of inventory, but there are other
ways to get reasonable handles on these things. Even if
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you're wrong it's probably not going to have a significant

impact on the financial statements or the record earnings
or maybe the net worth for one year, the impact of some

of these major lawsuits, if they were to go against you,
and they may not go against you, and therefore you don't
book anything, you don't give people an average number.

I've never seen anybody booking the worst
case situation. GAAP doesn't call for it.

And investors

are on a different side of this, you never anticipate
this tremendous event that happens, you only record it when

it does. All you're doing is telling a guy that this is
significant in trying to understand the numbers before you,
and you only do it in my experience when this is something
that can be very, very material.

A SPEAKER:

But again that seems to be rebated

to an issue of GAAP, not an issue of the opinion.
if in fact

You know

you question whether something should be

booked, again we're dealing with an FASB issue.
MR. HODGES:
are not accountants as such.

I'm telling you most investors
They read the English language,

they understand it. They don't know the technical rules of
either auditing or accounting, but they are trying to draw

182

an impression from something they read.

It looks like a

company with a growing earnings record.

And if you by a

footnote don't really force upon them clearly, "Here's
something that's so material or could be so material that
all of these numbers about this nice earnings program are

immaterial” —
A SPEAKER:

And yet you could have an

enormous unfunded pension liability that is out of the net.

. A SPEAKER:

We need more flags.

That's the job here.
MR. HODGES:

We haven't seen a case where

it's all going to come due tomorrow, the Judge is going
to make a decision that comes through tomorrow.

MR. KINNEY:

Howard, is this again a small

investor large company difference here, because for the
public companies traded, the stock prices show the price
of the stock goes down before the report goes out.

These analysts who are talking about finding

this in the auditor's report are going to be days late and

several dollars short in trying to save the plan's money
because the stock is down by the time the report hits the

street.

183

Now, for bankers that may be a different
situation because perhaps the first to know is the banker,
but for public funds the studies show the price is down

well before the auditor’s report comes out, and almost no
reaction later.

And if the analysts were surprised at the

"Subject To" opinion it seems the prices would react

violently when this report hits the street, yet they
don’t.

The price declines well before that. So it's not

so much information to the market.

It concerns it, perhaps

but —

MR. HODGES:
per share?

Is that really true of earnings

The report concerns something all along, and

some people get the information late, but better than never.
MR. SAMPSON:

information.

It concerns the market price

That doesn't mean you shouldn't give it.
MR. MULLARKEY:

I want to on behalf of the

Board, particularly the task force that will be able to

review the record and isolate the information that we need

to go on with this project to determine what the appropriate
course of action is, on behalf of all of those people I
would like to express our appreciation for coming to the
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meeting and being so candid and open in sharing your
insights into this issue.

It's an area obviously controversial and
difficult. We are all trying to reason to the right answer,
and your insights will help us quite a lot.

I very much appreciate your participating

in the meeting today.
CHAIRMAN LEISENRING: One final comment
and I think an especial thanks is necessary because all of

us around the table obviously, with one exception, have a
very real interest in the outcome of this decision — that
isn't true of your position, coining from Canada, but we

especially appreciate the effort and the time you have
taken to devote to our project, and I hope you will

feel free to call on us, and if we can reciprocate we

would be most happy to do so.
I do genuinely appreciate your coming,

Mr. Knowles, thank you.

One thing, could we ask the Auditing

Standards Board staff and the members to stay here.
(Whereupon, at 2:45 P.M. the meeting

was adjourned.)

